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 Abstract 
 
Emotions are an important underlying factor that may interact with pressure and other 
situational variables to influence auditors’ judgments and decisions. This study seeks to identify 
emotional intelligence (EI) as a key factor in dealing with emotions and pressures in an audit 
context. In this paper, I focus on how EI may influence the relation between job pressures (i.e., 
time budget pressure and client incentive pressure) on the auditor’s judgment. Specifically, I 
investigate the moderating effect of emotional intelligence on auditor judgments when auditors 
experience both internal and external pressures. The results suggest that the moderating influence 
of EI on auditor judgments can effectively reduce auditors’ tendency to engage in dysfunctional 
behavior in order to improve audit quality. Furthermore, there is a positive relation between EI 
and professional skepticism suggesting that auditors with high EI are more skeptical and assess 
higher risk than auditors with low EI. Finally, moderation analysis suggests that EI is a 
significant mechanism which drives the joint effects of different type of pressures on auditor 
judgments.  
 
Key words: Emotion intelligence, Time budget pressure, Client pressure, Auditor judgment 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Recent changes in regulation and audit processes underscore the importance of 
identifying and understanding the unobservable elements that influence audit quality (Cianci and 
Bierstaker, 2009; Trotman, 2011). Emotion is an important underlying factor that may interact 
with other situational variables to influence auditors’ judgments and decisions. This study seeks 
to identify emotional intelligence (EI) as a key factor in dealing with emotions and pressures in 
an audit context.  
Nelson and Tan (2005) describe the importance of understanding the effect of emotions 
on auditors’ judgment and decision making (JDM) and call for additional research in this area. 
Bhattacharjee, Moreno and Riley (2011) find that interpersonal affect (interactions between 
auditors and clients) has a negative effect on auditors’ inventory judgments. These results 
emphasize the importance of auditors recognizing and managing their affective reactions when 
dealing with clients. Despite this, very few studies investigate the effect of emotions on auditor 
decision making. 
Emotional intelligence has received considerable attention in several other disciplines, 
including industrial and organizational psychology, organizational behavior, and management. 
EI refers to one’s ability to perceive and manage emotions in oneself and others (e.g., Goleman, 
1995; Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso, 2000). Prior research reveals the importance of EI as a 
predictor of job performance and its role in relieving job stress (e.g., Joseph and Newman, 2010; 
O’Boyle, Humphrey, Pollack, Hawver ,and Story, 2010). For example, many studies document 
the positive effect of EI on job performance (e.g., Semadar, Robins, and Ferris, 2006; Joseph and 
Newman, 2010). In addition, EI adds incremental explanatory power above and beyond 
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personality and cognitive ability when predicting job performance (e.g. Locke, 2005; Rode, 
Mooney, Arthaud-Day, Near, Baldwin, and Rubin, 2007; O’ Boyleet al., 2010). Furthermore, 
Nikolaou and Tsaousis (2002) find a negative correlation between emotional intelligence and 
stress at work. That is, individuals with high EI experience less stress at work than those with 
low EI.  
Pressure is a major dimension of occupational stress (Vagg and Spielberger, 1998; 
Larson, 2004). Pressure is defined as “an objective stimulus construct referring to individual 
characteristics or combinations of characteristics and events that impinge on the perceptual and 
cognitive processes of individual” (DeZoort and Lord 1997, p.31). The effect of pressure has 
received considerable attention in the area of public accounting (e.g., DeZoort and Lord, 1997; 
Schiltz and Syverud, 1999; Fogarty, Jagdip, Gary, and Ronald, 2000; Jones, Norman and Wier, 
2010). For example, work-related pressure has been found to have a positive relation with stress 
perceptions of lower rank auditors including seniors and staff auditors1 (Margheim, Kelly, and 
Pattison, 2005).  
In a review of research on the effects of pressure in accounting settings, DeZoort and 
Lord (1997) call for greater exploration into individual factors that may mitigate the negative 
effects of pressure in the accounting profession. They state that factors related to emotion-
focused coping to reduce or manage emotional distress are of particular interest. In addition, a 
recent study by Low and Tan (2011) recognizes the adverse effects of time pressures and 
suggests that future research should identify strategies that allow professional accountant to 
better cope with time constraints. Thus, an investigation of the potential for EI to moderate these 
pressure effects is a direct answer to these calls for research.  
                                                          
1 An auditor’s career path typically beings with a staff auditor position, progresses to audit senior to audit manager 
to senior audit manager to partner. 
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Moreover, given major changes in the auditing field (e.g., SOX, SAS No. 99) it is 
important to understand how to manage emotions and relationships, because emotions are 
essential to auditors’ work (Damasio, 1994; Bhattacharjee et al., 2011). Therefore, one purpose 
of this study addresses a gap in the literature by investigating the effect of EI on auditor 
judgment under pressures.  
DeZoort and Lord (1997) describe three pressure constructs that are applicable to the 
accounting context: organizational, environmental and role characteristics. Organizational 
pressures are primarily originated by forces in a firm (e.g., time budget pressure and 
accountability), while environmental pressures originate from forces external to the audit 
professional’s firm (e.g., client incentive pressure and litigation). Role characteristic pressures 
cause role stress and influence auditor behaviors (e.g., ambiguity, conflict, and perceived 
environmental uncertainty).  
 In this dissertation, I focus on how EI influences the relations between auditor judgment 
and two prevalent forms of job pressures: time budget pressure and client incentive pressure. To 
investigate these relations, I first examine the individual and joint influence of time budget 
pressure and client incentive pressure on auditor judgment. It is critical for auditors to employ EI 
skills in their relationships with clients when conducting audits (Akers and Porter, 2003). 
Therefore, I also investigate the moderating effect of emotional intelligence on auditor 
judgments when auditors experience both forms of pressure. Thus, the research questions 
addressed in this dissertation are: 
1. Does emotional intelligence moderate the effect of time budget pressure on auditor 
judgments? 
 
2. Does emotional intelligence moderate the effect of client pressure on auditor 
judgments? 
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3. Does emotional intelligence moderate the interactive effect of time budget pressure 
and client pressure on auditor judgments? 
 
 
 Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the proposed model of the relations 
between the constructs investigated in this study.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 To address the research questions, I conducted an experiment using two-hundred staff 
and senior auditors working at auditing firms in China. This participant group was selected for 
two important reasons. First, the current study focuses on auditors in China due to widespread 
concern in recent years regarding suspicious accounting practices and dysfunctional audit 
behaviors in China (Chow, Ho, and Mo, 2006; Firth, Mo, and Wong, 2012).Thus, this participant 
groups facilitates an investigation of the factors influencing such behaviors and a potential 
moderator that can mitigate dysfunctional auditor behavior to improve audit quality.  
Second, staff accountants and audit seniors were selected as participants to provide the 
best match between participants and the task of interest. Less experienced auditors are more 
likely to interact with the lower levels of the client’s management when conducting inquiries 
during the audit than audit managers and partners and are therefore more likely to be influenced 
by any pressures that may be present (Abdolmohammadi, 1999; Bennett and Hatfield, 2013; 
Bhattacharjee et al., 2011). Moreover, lower rank auditors are more susceptible to client 
pressures because they are less experienced and subject to performance evaluations that 
emphasize both cost control and good client relationships. Auditors’ performance evaluations 
and compensation plans may impair auditors’ objectivity when evaluating the client’s reporting 
practices (Chang and Hwang, 2003). Prior studies document a negative relation between auditor 
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experience and the influence of emotions on their judgment (Bhattacharjee and Moreno, 2002; 
Bhattacharjee et al., 2011).  
 The experimental task presents auditors with a hypothetical scenario involving a 
questionable accounts receivable transaction. The presence and absence of an internal pressure 
(time budget pressure) and an external pressure (client incentive pressure) were manipulated 
between participants. Participants are asked to indicate the material misstatement risk associated 
with this transaction and the likelihood that they will investigate further. Further, participants 
provide responses to a 16-item EI scale.  
As hypothesized, the results reveal different judgment patterns for participants with high 
and low EI. Specifically, EI was found to moderate the relations between job pressures and 
auditor judgments. Auditors with high EI make more conservative judgments than auditors with 
low EI when they are exposed to job pressures. For example, participants with low EI are more 
likely to investigate a questionable account receivable transaction further when they experience 
high client incentive pressure and low time budget pressure. However, high EI participants 
assess higher misstatement risk and are more likely to investigate the questionable transaction 
further when they are exposed to both internal and external pressures at work. Therefore, these 
results indicate that the moderating influence of EI on auditor judgments can effectively reduce 
auditors’ tendency to engage in dysfunctional behavior promoted by different pressures. 
 Furthermore, professional skepticism is found to be significantly related to the level of 
EI, suggesting that auditors with high EI are more skeptical and assess higher risk than auditors 
with low EI. In summary, moderation analysis suggests that EI is a significant mechanism which 
drives the joint effects of different type of pressures on auditor judgments.  
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 These results of this study are important for several reasons. First, prior research 
recognizes the impact of emotions on accounting professionals’ decision-making processes. 
Academic researchers have raised the issue of whether EI, (the ability to recognize and manage 
emotions), has an impact on auditors’ JDM (e.g. Nelson and Tan, 2005; Bay and McKeage, 2006; 
Cianci and Bierstaker, 2009; Bhattacharjee et al., 2011). Recent accounting studies argue that EI 
is a critical skill that allows accountants to have better job performance in decision making, 
teamwork and client relations (Cook et al., 2011; Daff et al., 2012). This study provides 
empirical evidence supporting these assertions of the importance of EI for professional 
accountants. 
 In addition, job-related pressures play a significant role in the accounting profession, and 
there is a need to improve our understanding of how to mitigate the ill-effects of these pressures 
because such pressures may lead to dysfunctional auditor behaviors and decreased audit quality 
(e.g., Davis, DeZoort and Kopp, 2006; Hartmann and Maas, 2010). Prior research has examined 
and documented how audit judgment is negatively influenced by time budget pressure (e.g., 
McNair, 1991; Coram, Ng, and Woodliff, 2003; 2004) and client pressure (e.g., Hackenbrack 
and Nelson, 1996; Moreno and Bhattacharjee, 2003). It is therefore important to understand 
factors mitigating the negative effects of these pressures on auditor judgments. The current study 
provides evidence confirming the critical role of EI in mitigating the joint effects of time budget 
pressure and client pressure on auditor judgments. Thus, this study provides valuable insight into 
a skill that can be utilized in improving auditing effectiveness. Further, these results suggest that 
EI training programs may be a valuable way to improve the judgments of auditors.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the background, prior 
literature on EI and job pressures in an audit context, and develops the hypotheses. Chapter 3 
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describes the research methodology, the research instrument, and the data sources. Chapter 4 
reports the results of the analyses. Chapter 5 highlights the contributions and implications of the 
study, and concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the study and potential topics for 
future research.  
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Chapter II 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Affect and Emotions 
 Affect is a broad term, referring to emotions, feelings, and moods (Fiske and Taylor, 
1991; Baxter and Hunton, 2011; Schultz, Schafer, and Schafer, 2011). Emotions are defined as 
“organized responses, crossing the boundaries of many psychological subsystems, including the 
physiological, cognitive, motivational, and experiential system” (Salovey and Mayer, 1990, p. 
186). Moods differ from emotions, because moods are emotional states of a prolonged duration, 
whereas emotions are transient and more intense. 
 Barsade and Gibson (2007) reviewed the role of affect in organizational behavior and 
analyzed its impact on critical organizational outcomes such as job performance and decision 
making. They concluded that affect, including employees’ moods and emotions, is positively 
correlated with important organizational outcomes such as performance, decision making, 
conflict resolution behavior, and leadership. Furthermore, positive affect has a relatively stronger 
influence on these outcomes because positive affect has a stronger relation to socially related 
processes. Emotional intelligence has been identified as an important mechanism that influences 
affect in organizations (Barsade and Gibson, 2007).  
 Prior studies in the accounting literature have identified the role of affect, including 
moods and emotions, on decision making (e.g., Chong, Monroe, and Soutar, 2004; Baxter and 
Hunton, 2011; Schultz, Schafer, and Schafer, 2011). Bhattacharjee and Moreno (2002) 
investigated the role of experience and emotional reactions in audit judgment and found that 
experience has an impact on negative affect during an audit judgment task. Specifically, less 
experienced auditors are more likely to be influenced by induced client affect. This study 
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suggests EI as a factor that may mitigate the influence of affect on the judgment of accounting 
professionals.  
 Chong, Monroe, and Soutar (2004) examined the joint effects of emotional reaction and 
the cognitive role of occupational stress on public accountants’ performance in Australia. The 
results from a structural equation model (SEM) demonstrate a significant negative relation 
between the emotional reaction to occupational stress and job performance. Their study 
emphasized the importance of reducing negative emotional reactions and the cognitive role of 
occupational stress among public accountants.  
Chung, Cohen, and Monroe (2008) argued that mood is an emotional state that is 
generally task-irrelevant, but that emotions are generally task involved. Chung et al. (2008) 
tested whether different mood states influenced an auditor’s decision making process. They 
surveyed over 100 Australian auditors and found positive-mood individuals had the lowest 
consensus and made the least conservative judgments of inventory valuation. Since these results 
indicate that mood states influence auditor judgment, the authors conclude that it is desirable to 
mitigate such affect in order to avoid potential bias on auditors’ JDM (e.g., professional 
conservatism). Chung et al. (2008) call for additional research on the effects of emotion in audit-
related situations, such as during the stressful busy audit season. In response, Schafer and 
Schafer (2009) investigated whether two debasing mechanisms, justification (providing reasons 
for judgment) and self-review (careful consideration of alternative possibilities), mitigated the 
effects of affect and client likeability (auditor-client relationship) in a fraud judgment task. 
Consistent with previous studies, inexperienced auditors were found to generate biases of client 
preference in fraud judgment. However, by manipulating the levels of debasing mechanisms, 
only self-review was found to mitigate the client preference bias effectively.  
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 Cianci and Bierstaker (2009) found evidence that mood influences auditors’ hypothesis 
generation and ethical judgments differentially. Specifically, a negative (versus positive) mood 
led to less ethical judgments and the authors explained that the mixed results of mood effect may 
be due to the nature of task. Furthermore, Cianci and Bierstaker (2009) acknowledged the need 
for auditors to manage their emotions and suggest that future research should explore ways in 
which auditors can be trained to manage their emotions.  
 Further, another study conducted by Bhattacharjee et al. (2011) tested the joint effects of 
interpersonal affect and source reliability on auditors’ inventory judgment. Results show that 
interpersonal affective reactions to clients influenced lower rank auditors’ judgments and 
induced inappropriate workpaper documentation. Bhattacharjee et al. (2011) advocated 
emotional competence training, because it is important for accounting professionals to 
understand and manage their emotions. Shawver and Clements (2012) explored the impact of 
emotions (regret, relief, and satisfaction) on moral judgment. They asked accountants to rate 
feelings of emotions and found that regret may deter unethical decisions when evaluating 
earnings manipulations (Shawver and Clements, 2012). Results of this study suggested that the 
intentional evaluation of emotions may be useful in discouraging future unethical choices.  
The study of affect has broad implications to other specialties such as tax accounting. In 
an effort to extend our understanding of the role of affect in accounting decision making, Schultz 
et al.(2011) explored the influence of mood and client likeability on tax judgment. They found a 
positive relation between client likeability and tax judgment favorable to clients and a negative 
relation between mood (negative) and tax judgment (more favorable to their clients). Their 
results are consistent with those of Cianci and Bierstaker (2009) who found that affect influences 
professional judgments in an auditing setting.  
15 
 
In summary, prior research provides evidence of the importance of affect and the 
potential for mood and emotion to influence the decision-making processes in accounting 
settings. However, there is scant literature exploring how to influence affect in behavioral 
accounting research. Emotional intelligence shows promise as a potential mitigating factor to 
address this issue (Barsade and Gibson, 2007). Further, recent changes in regulation and audit 
processes provide opportunities for the use of experiments to determine the unobserved effects 
that influence audit quality and to explicate the underlying reasons for these effects (Cianci and 
Bierstaker, 2009; Trotman, 2011). 
Definition of Emotional Intelligence  
 Emotional intelligence has received considerable attention for over two decades in a 
variety of disciplines including management, organizational behavior, and psychology. In the 
early 1990s, Salovey and Mayer (1990) initially defined EI as “the subset of social intelligence 
that involves the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate 
among them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions” (p. 189). EI is 
considered to be more important than Intelligence Quotient (IQ) in determining success in both 
professional and personal life (Goleman, 1995).  
 Later, Mayer and Salovey (1997) redefined EI as “the ability to perceive and express 
emotion, assimilate emotion in thought, understand and reason with emotion, and regulate 
emotion in the self and others” (p. 10). This conceptualization is now widely accepted (Cheriness, 
2010). Based on this construction, a mental ability model of emotional intelligence was 
developed and presented with more psychologically integrated processes (Mayer and Salovey, 
1997; Mayer et al., 2000). This model includes four components: (1) awareness of one’s own and 
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others’ emotion; (2) emotional facilitation; (3) emotional understanding; (4) management of 
one’s own and others’ emotions. 
 Although there are alternative definitions of EI, many are related to the Mayer and 
Salovey (1997) model (Cherniss, 2010). For example, Bar-On (1997) defined EI as emotional-
social intelligence comprised of the five key components of intrapersonal skills, interpersonal 
skills, adaptability, stress management, and general mood. Goleman (1995) defined EI as “self-
control, zeal and persistence, and the ability to motivate oneself” (p.xii). Goleman’s model 
includes five different aspects of EI: knowing ones’ emotions; management of emotions; 
motivating oneself; recognizing emotions in others; and handling relationships.  
Importance of EI on Work Behaviors  
 Prior research in the fields of organizational behavior and management highlights the 
importance of EI as a predictor of job performance and its role in relieving job stress (e.g., Daus 
and Ashkanasy, 2005; Joseph and Newman, 2010; O’ Boyle et al., 2010). Nikolaou and Tsaousis 
(2002) surveyed more than 200 health professionals and found strong relations between 
emotional intelligence, occupational stress, and organizational commitment. Results indicate that 
employees high in EI perceived lower stress and reported higher organizational commitment. In 
other words, individuals with high EI exhibit less stress, more organizational loyalty, and higher 
commitment compared to those with low EI. Medical and psychological personnel were found to 
have high EI and correspondingly low occupational stress. The authors concluded that this is 
because these professionals are trained to manage their own and other people’s feelings. This 
training then serves as a mechanism which allows them to effectively decrease their occupational 
stress.  
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 Jordan et al. (2002) presented a two-stage model of the relation between job insecurity 
and workplace behavior based on the cognitive processes of emotions The authors reasoned that 
because job insecurity can result in increased stress and decreased performance, it is important to 
investigate the moderating effect of emotional intelligence on employees’ perceptions of job 
insecurity, as well as the behavioral response to emotions. They concluded that employees with 
high EI are likely able to “recognize and to cope proactively with the emotional consequences of 
job insecurity, especially job-related tension” (p. 370).   
To investigate the relations among employees’ emotional intelligence, job satisfaction, 
and performance, 187 service employees from a restaurant franchise participated in a study by 
Sy, et al. (2006). Results confirmed the predicted hypotheses that employees’ EI was positively 
related to both job satisfaction and job performance after controlling for personality factors. This 
study supports prior research by finding that employees’ with higher EI have higher job 
satisfaction because they are better able to identify and regulate their emotions (Wong and Law, 
2002).  
 Rode et al. (2007) tested the direct and moderated effects of EI on individual 
performance by surveying over 300 business undergraduate students. After controlling for 
general mental ability and personality, EI was found to explain incremental variance on students’ 
public speaking effectiveness. Moreover, this study concluded that the interaction of EI and 
conscientiousness (one proxy for trait motivation) has a positive effect on academic performance. 
That is, individuals with high EI and high conscientiousness will be more likely to use their 
strong EI abilities because they are motivated to do so. 
 Guleryuz et al. (2008) examined the effect of EI on job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment. They collected 267 questionnaires from healthcare organizations and used SEM to 
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test the relations between these three variables. Results demonstrated that EI was significantly 
and positively related to job satisfaction and organizational commitment.  
Because EI has been documented as a predictor in major domains, including job 
performance, academic performance, emotional labor, trust, work-family conflict and stress,   O’ 
Boyle et al. (2010) explored how EI is related to job performance in a manner not explained by 
personality traits and cognitive ability. The results from this meta-analysis of over 1,000 cited 
studies indicated that EI is significantly positively associated with work-related outcomes and is 
an important predictor of job performance.  
 Daus and Ashkanasy (2005) argued that jobs involving interaction with customers require 
employees having emotional skills and abilities—both in one’s self and in dealing with others. 
Thus, auditing is a job with strong emotional intelligence implications, because auditors 
constantly interact with client management during audit process (Nelson and Tan 2005). These 
interactions are critical not only to the successful completion of the current audit engagement, 
but also have implications for future engagements. For example, auditors have incentives to 
retain large clients (Chen, Sun, and Wu, 2010) and to explore potential business opportunities 
with current clients (Moreno and Bhattacharjee, 2003).  
Collectively, research indicates that EI is critical for effective job performance and that it 
can ameliorate negative stress outcomes (Daus and Ashkanasy, 2005). Indeed, awareness of EI 
(identifying and expressing emotions) has been found to facilitate employees’ ability to cope 
with occupational stressors (Jordan et al., 2002; Nikolaou and Tsaousis, 2002). 
 Prior research indicates that it is important to identify factors that mitigate the negative 
effects of various forms of pressure in accounting. One important variable that can manage or 
reduce emotional pressure is emotion-focused coping (DeZoort and Lord, 1997; DeZoort, 1998). 
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The importance of EI is also recognized by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) and the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA), as “emotional 
intelligence skills are critical for the success of the accounting profession” (Akers and Porter, 
2003, p. 65). Further, Bay and McKeage (2006) argued that the effects of EI on job performance 
are important to accounting practitioners for two reasons. First, since EI has a positive impact on 
job performance, it is rational to conclude that there is a link between EI and auditor decision 
making. Second, EI related programs could improve hiring and training processes in the 
accounting field.  
 Recently, Cook et al. (2011) examined the role of accounting education and work 
experience on EI. They surveyed more than four hundreds accounting and liberal arts students. 
The results suggest that work experience has a positive relation with the score of EI. However, 
current higher education does not necessarily increase students’ EI level. Another study by Daff 
et al. (2012) also addressed the need for accountants to have both the generic skills and EI, as the 
importance of EI skills on job performance (e.g. decision making, client relation, leadership) has 
been recognized in public accounting (PricewaterhouseCoopers,2011). EI skill enables 
accountants to perform better in terms of dealing with their own emotions and others’ emotions. 
Thus, this study examines the potential moderating role of EI on the relation between pressure 
and auditor judgment.  
 Pressure  
There is a significant body of evidence suggesting that audit pressures can lead to 
dysfunctional behavior. According to DeZoort and Lord (1997), pressures serve as antecedents to 
stress responses within individuals and influence outcomes by providing situational incentives 
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for a specific judgment or decision. Thus, pressure has been viewed as a major dimension of 
occupational stress (Vagg and Spielberger, 1998; Larson, 2004).  
Work-related pressure has been found to have a positive relation with stress perceptions 
of lower rank auditors including seniors and staff (Margheim et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
contextual factors, such as the impact of time pressure on auditors’ judgment, make public 
accounting an appropriate setting to evaluate the impact of pressure on JDM (Gibbins, 2001). 
This study investigates the effects of two types of pressure: time budget pressure and client 
incentive pressure. 
Time Budget Pressure 
Studies of auditors in American, Australian and European contexts indicate that the 
presence of time budget pressure (unattainable/unreasonable time budgets or deadlines) results in 
ethical dilemmas which significantly impair audit quality (McNair, 1991; Buchheit, Pasewark, 
and Strawser, 2003; Coram et al., 2003; 2004; Arnold, Bernardi, and Neidermeyer, 2009). Time 
budget pressure is defined as “a chronic, pervasive type of pressure that arises from limitations 
on the resources allocable to perform a task” (DeZoort and Lord, 1997, p.53). It occurs when 
auditors are assigned limited hours to complete audit procedures. Kelley and Margheim (1990) 
investigated factors that influence dysfunctional auditor behavior. Results indicate that time 
budget pressure leads to dysfunctional auditor behaviors (e.g., accepting weak client 
explanations, premature sign-off on audit steps, underreporting of time actually spent performing 
audit procedures). According to McNair (1991), time budget pressure can also undermine 
auditors’ control environment. Moreover, time pressure is not only a critical factor that 
influences the results of auditors’ JDM in experimental research, but it is also an important 
variable in actual audit engagements (Choo and Firth, 1998).  
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Braun (2000) addressed the role of time budget pressure in fraud detection. This study 
revealed that auditors may not pay adequate attention to qualitative aspects of misstatements 
when subjected to time budget pressures. This finding supports the Treadway Commission’s 
admonition regarding the negative effect of time budget pressure. The negative effect of 
unreasonable time constraints may also be related to professional skepticism, as auditors who are 
faced with a high pressure situation may overlook critical audit evidence and fail to keep a 
questioning mind (Braun, 2000, p.255). Accordingly, lower levels of professional skepticism 
may lead to dysfunctional audit behaviors and harm audit quality as a consequence.  
Using a sample of Australian auditors, Coram et al. (2003) conducted an experiment and 
found that more than 90% of participants felt more pressure when there is more work to do than 
there is time budgeted to do it. Participants also admitted to accepting doubtful audit evidence in 
order to speed audit testing under time budget pressure. The use of such questionable methods 
decreases audit quality. In a subsequent study, Coram et al. (2004) investigated the impact of 
time budget pressure and risk of misstatement on auditors’ propensity to commit reduced audit 
quality acts (RAQs) in the US. Results indicate that auditors accept doubtful audit evidence 
under high time budget pressure and fail to test all items in a selected sample when the level of 
misstatement risk is low. Thus, time budget pressure is negatively related to audit effectiveness.  
Since audit effectiveness suffers under time constraints, Margheim et al. (2005) 
employed a case method to investigate the impact of different types of time pressure, (time 
budget pressure and time deadline pressure), on auditor behavior. Time budget pressure arises 
when restricted time resources are given to complete specified audit procedures, while time 
deadline pressure arises from the requirement for task completion by a specific point in time 
(DeZoort and Lord, 1997). Time budget pressure is found to induce a wider range of 
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dysfunctional behaviors than time deadline pressure, because it significantly increases auditors’ 
perceptions of stress (Margheim et al., 2005). 
Similarly, Gundry, and Liyanarachchi (2007) used auditor data from New Zealand to 
analyze the relation between time budget pressure and RAQs. The authors found a negative 
relation between time budget pressure and one RAQ – premature auditor sign-off. They also 
concluded that auditors under high time budget pressure may sign off on audit steps with 
incomplete work or omitted procedures. Interestingly, the results also indicate a significant 
relation between Type-A personality type and RAQs. For example, when Type-A individuals are 
under pressure, they may be more likely to engage in dysfunctional behavior because the Type-A 
behavior pattern is associated with certain attributes, including being aggressive, ambitious, 
competitive, impatient, and experiencing higher levels of stress (Gundry and Liyanarachchi, 
2007).  
 Prior research indicates that time budget pressure is an important factor affecting auditors’ 
behavior in both developed and developing countries, since meeting time budgets is a critical 
element of auditors’ performance evaluations (Shapeero, Koh ,and Killough, 2003). In other 
words, time budget pressure may induce auditors’ underreporting behavior, which undermines 
firms’ employee performance evaluations. For example, Soobaroyen and Chengabroyan (2006) 
argued that there are differences in the extent and impact of time budget pressures among 
auditors in less developed countries. Based on a sample of auditors from Mauritius, they 
examined whether perceptions of time budget pressure influenced dysfunctional behaviors of 
auditors. The findings were consistent with studies in an Australian context which indicate that 
time budget pressure is significantly related to premature sign-offs (Coram et al., 2003). This 
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issue deserves local policy makers’ attention, because premature sign-offs diminish audit quality 
(Soobaroyen and Chengabroyan, 2006, p. 215).  
 Recently, Paino, Ismail and Smith (2010) conducted a survey to identify the key variables 
leading to RAQs among Malaysian auditors. Results showed that time budget pressures lead 
lower rank auditors to engage in dysfunctional behavior. Moreover, Malaysian auditor 
participants indicated a higher level of time budget attainability than US and Irish counterparts 
(Kelley and Seiler, 1982; Otley and Pierce,1996; Paino et al., 2010).  
 Time budget pressure is also of particular interest in China. For example, Liu and Zhang 
(2008) conducted an experiment to investigate the effects of time pressure and accountability on 
audit judgment performance finding a negative relation between audit effectiveness and time 
pressure. They argued that time pressure in an auditing context is becoming an increasingly 
important environmental factor in China warranting more research. Considering the convergence 
of auditing standards, it is of interest to reevaluate the negative effects of time budget pressure. 
Further, prior research reviewed opportunities for audit judgment research in China and one 
potential research question is the influence of time pressure and incentives on auditor judgment 
(Simunic and Wu, 2009; Trotman, 1999). 
 Because prior studies (e.g., Coram et al., 2003; 2004) have demonstrated that time budget 
pressure results in less conservative judgments, and that these quality-threatening effects 
compromise audit quality, my first hypothesis is: 
H1: Auditors will make more conservative judgments when they experience less 
time pressure.  
 
Client Pressure 
 An important environmental issue in an auditing context is client pressure, which refers 
to “the pressure to yield or the perceived pressure to yield to a client’s wishes or influence, 
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whether appropriate or not” (DeZoort and Lord, 1997, p.47). Prior research raises issues 
regarding pressures arising from auditors’ conflicting incentives and acceptance of clients’ 
aggressive financial reporting behaviors. The resulting dysfunctional behavior could impair audit 
quality because of biased judgment. For example, Hakenbrack and Nelson (1996) found that 
lower rank auditors may allow clients to use aggressive reporting methods in moderate 
engagement-risk situations when imprecise language is used in financial accounting standards.  
 Houston (1999) examined the joint effects of two environmental pressures (fee pressure 
and client risk) on audit seniors’ JDM. The analysis reveals that auditors make time budget 
decisions subject to environmental pressures. That is, auditors’ decisions were less responsive to 
increased client risk, and auditors planned fewer audit procedures if fee pressure was present. 
Accordingly, the study raised the concern of whether pressures that influence auditors’ budget 
hours would also bias their risk assessment.  
 Chang and Hwang (2003) conducted a survey of fifty-five audit seniors and managers 
from Big 5 firms and found that an auditor might be willing to accept a client’s aggressive 
reporting behaviors if retention incentives were high, and if there was less concern for client 
business risks. Similarly, Kadous, Kennedy, and Peecher (2003) predicted the influence of 
auditors’ directional goals (preference of decision) on their acceptance decisions of client-
preferred accounting methods. Their results support the hypotheses that auditors with high 
commitment to directional goals will accept the method preferred by the client. 
Another study by Moreno and Bhattacharjee (2003) investigated whether auditors’ 
judgments were influenced by pressure from a potential client’s additional business opportunities. 
Generating additional services for clients is very important to performance evaluations and the 
socialization process of lower rank auditors. Their results indicated that lower rank auditors may 
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support a client’s preferences in order to maintain a good relationship with the client and explore 
potential business opportunities. Accordingly, performance evaluations and the socialization 
process can play an important role in auditor behaviors that reduce audit quality (Moreno and 
Bhattacharjee, 2003). Thus, the pressure to not disappoint clients can negatively influence an 
auditors’ judgment (Nelson, 2006). Future research should investigate how auditors can manage 
client pressure to maintain their independence.   
Consistent with prior research, Cianci and Bierstaker (2009) claimed that auditors’ ethical 
judgments are influenced by client pressure in spite of legislation intended to enhance audit 
quality. Sharma, Sharma, and Ananthanarayanan (2011) examined the relation between client 
importance and earnings management by inspecting data from the New Zealand Stock Exchange. 
The empirical evidence confirms a positive relation between the two variables, thus supporting 
previous experimental studies that showed that the economic importance of a client has a 
negative effect on audit quality (Sharma et al., 2011).  
Recently, Hatfield, Jackson, and Vandervelde (2011) investigated the effect of client 
pressure on auditor judgment following the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). 
Their results provided evidence that client pressure significantly reduces the magnitude of 
proposed audit adjustments. That is, auditors subjected to high levels of client pressure propose 
significantly smaller audit adjustments than the auditors subjected to low levels of client pressure. 
Thus, Hatfield et al. (2011) concluded that client pressure still has a meaningful influence on 
auditor judgments in the post-SOX audit environment. 
 Since client pressures have been shown to impair audit quality, Asare, Cianci, and 
Tsakumis (2009) investigated the mediating effect of litigation consciousness and experience on 
the effect of client relations pressure on auditors’ judgment. The findings show that less 
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experienced auditors are more influenced by client goals. Furthermore, the results indicate that 
auditors’ litigation consciousness is a significant mechanism that mediates the joint effect of 
client oriented goals and experience on auditors’ judgment. Also, litigation concerns lead 
auditors to be more objective and skeptical (Johnstone, 2000). In other words, auditors’ litigation 
risks help balance the tradeoff between experience and client relations, which leads to 
significantly more conservative judgments. This study calls for additional research on the other 
individual level factors that may reduce auditors’ vulnerability to clients’ pressures and explain 
the causes of auditors’ biased judgments. Research of these mediation factors contribute to the 
improvement of auditors’ judgment by encouraging the development of more efficient audit 
procedures, decision aids, and training programs.  
 Overall, previous research indicates that client-based incentives and pressures can 
compromise auditor judgment. Lower rank auditors are especially susceptible to client pressures 
because they are less experienced and subject to performance evaluations that emphasize both 
cost control and a good relationship with the client. In addition, Chinese auditors are more likely 
to perceive client pressure in conflict situations than their counterparts from the UK when facing 
a high degree of audit market competition (Lin and Fraser, 2008). Therefore, based on the 
preceding arguments, my second hypothesis is: 
H2a: Auditors will make more conservative judgments when the client has low 
incentives to influence the auditor.  
 
However, prior research has shown that auditors should exercise a high degree of 
professional skepticism when evaluating the likelihood of material misstatement, especially if 
clients’ monetary incentives are based on financial results (Hirst, 1994). According to source 
credibility theory, an increase of a source’s (i.e. client’s) incentive should decrease their 
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credibility (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979). Source bias is one component influencing the 
credibility of an information source (DeZoort, Hermanson, and Houston, 2003).  
Robertson (2010) argued that clients’ credibility decreases if they have personal and/or 
corporate incentives to influence the auditor. His study investigated whether auditors would be 
more likely to comply with client requests when the client has low rather than high incentive to 
influence the auditor. Results show that auditors were more likely to propose adjustments when 
the client has high incentive to influence the auditor indicating that client incentives were 
associated with greater auditor conservatism.  
Consequently, a client’s incentive to manage earnings may lead auditors to be more 
skeptical and collect more evidence on clients’ reporting. Thus, as the client’s incentive 
increases, auditors may be more likely to make conservative judgments. In my setting, this is a 
direct contradiction with the prediction offered in H2a. Thus, I propose the following competing 
hypothesis: 
H2b: Auditors will make less conservative judgments when the client has low 
incentive to influence the auditor.  
 
 Further, I expect an interaction between time budget pressure and client incentive 
pressure.  Litigation risk leads auditors to increase their objectivity and skepticism when the 
client has incentive to influence auditors. In other words, client incentive pressure may cause 
auditors to exhibit greater professional skepticism and make more conservative judgments, 
regardless the tightness of the time budget. As a result, I expect auditors subject to client 
incentive pressure to spend the additional time and effort necessary to make the more 
conservative judgment, even when they are subject to time budget pressure. Thus, I hypothesize 
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that auditors will be influenced by time budget pressure to a greater extent when client incentive 
pressure is absent than when client incentive pressure is present. Stated formally:  
H3: Auditor judgment will be influenced by time budget pressure to a greater extent 
when client incentive pressure is absent than when client incentive pressure is 
present.  
 
Auditors’ JDM in China 
As Chinese capital markets continue to develop and mature, a concurrent development 
and maturation of a high quality system of attestation is imperative. This is especially true given 
the inadequate legal environment and system of inefficient corporate governance prevalent in 
China (Firth, Mo, and Wong, 2005; Lin, Liu, and Wang, 2009).  High audit quality could help 
ensure the implementation of an effective principals-based accounting system in order to protect 
the interests of individual investors in China.  
In a survey of experienced auditors in China, Chow et al. (2006) identified different 
pressures and factors that influenced auditors’ risk assessment. Many of the pressures identified 
were consistent with research from developed economies, such as clients’ incentives to manage 
earnings (e.g., management being under unusual pressures to meet profitability targets), the 
existence of complex transactions that are difficult to audit, and weak corporate governance 
(Chow et al., 2006).  
Since the institutional environment for investor protection is weaker in China than in 
developed countries, Chen et al. (2010) examined whether the impact of client economic 
importance on audit quality changed from 1995 to 2004, a period in which the institutional 
environment became more investor-friendly. However, they found that the correlation between 
client importance and the propensity to issue modified audit opinions (MAOs) that was 
significant prior to 2001 was no longer significant after that date. This result suggests that 
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individual auditors became more conservative and more likely to issue MAOs to large clients 
because of an improved legal and regulatory environment. 
China started the convergence process with ISA in 2005. These standards are intended to 
enhance audit quality and public confidence in the global auditing and assurance profession. 
China completed the convergence process in 2010 with some exceptions not covered by 
international standards. Haw (2008) calls for research regarding how new auditing standards 
influence the quality of auditing in China. Thus, it is of interest to investigate whether the 
dysfunctional audit behaviors (e.g., premature sign-offs) exist and whether audit quality is 
affected by pressure after the full convergence of ISA.  
In a study of EI and counterproductive behavior in China, Deshpande and Joesph (2005) 
found that participants with high EI were better corporate citizens and that EI is a good predictor 
of job performance. Specifically, employees with high EI had a positive impact on the 
workgroup, better understood others’ emotions, and worked well with others. Due to the 
importance of EI in the workplace, the authors suggest that Chinese firms provide training to 
raise employees’ EI. Their study recognizes the importance of EI in the workplace and suggests 
Chinese firms to provide training to raise employees’ EI, which can create a competitive 
advantage for firms (Deshpande and Joesph, 2005).  
In summary, prior research has consistently demonstrated a positive association between 
EI and job performance. Thus, it is logical to assume that EI will reduce auditors’ tendency to 
engage in dysfunctional behavior promoted by pressure, such as accepting weak client 
explanations, resulting in improved audit quality. Based on the preceding arguments, hypotheses 
3 through 5 are: 
H4: Auditors with high EI will make more conservative judgments than auditors 
with low EI when they are exposed to time budget pressure.  
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H5: Auditors with high EI will make more conservative judgments than auditors 
with low EI when they are exposed to client incentive pressure.  
 
H6: Auditors with high EI will make more conservative judgments than auditors 
with low EI when they are exposed to both time budget and client incentive 
pressure.  
 
Professional Skepticism 
Professional skepticism (PS) is an important concept in audit practice which has been 
defined as “an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit 
evidence” (AICPA, 1998, AU230.7). A questioning mind is required in the definitions of PS in 
both Statements Auditing Standards (SAS) Nos. 82 and 99 in the US (AICPA, 1997, 2002) and 
international standards (ISA, 240.24). More specifically, for auditing standards in the U.S. and 
China due professional care requires auditors to exercise professional skepticism based on 
available evidence without being influenced by the client (PCAOB, 2006; Chinese CPA 
Standards on Auditing, 2006). Prior studies have argued that professional skepticism is critical to 
mitigate aggressive reporting by management (Kadous, 2000). 
Hurtt (2010) pointed out that understanding people’s motivations and behaviors is an 
important component of skepticism. However, it is difficult to detect individuals’ motivations 
and perceptions when they have incentives to provide biased and misleading information. The 
skeptic can help to recognize the potential for biased judgment, because “the skeptical auditor is 
less influenced by the beliefs or persuasion attempts of others” (Hurtt, 2010, p.155).  
Chung, Cohen, and Monroe (2005) argued that moods are expected to have a significant 
effect on professional skepticism. Their experiment with 102 audit professionals supported the 
hypothesis that mood states influence professional skepticism. They found that positive-mood 
individuals were likely to be less skeptical than neutral and negative-mood individuals by 
demonstrating that positive-mood individuals made the least conservative valuation of inventory. 
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Nelson (2009) noted that auditors with high PS are more likely to question evidence of a truthful 
assertion and tend to gather more evidence on the assertion.  
Time pressure can influence PS by judgment processes (Nelson, 2009). For example, 
Braun (2000) found that PS may be associated with the negative effect of time pressure because 
auditors who are faced with high pressure situations may fail to keep a questioning mind (Braun, 
2000, p.255). Accordingly, a decline in professional skepticism may lead to dysfunctional audit 
behaviors and harm audit quality as a consequence. Therefore, professional skepticism is 
included in this study as a control variable.   
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Chapter III 
Research Methodology 
Experimental Design  
 This study adopts a 2 x 2 between-subjects experimental design. Independent variables 
include time budget pressure (low vs. high) and client incentive pressure (low vs. high). 
Participants are randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. The participants were provided 
with general study instructions and a research instrument (case materials). Additionally, 
participants were asked to complete both the EI scale from Jordan and Lawrence (2009) (16 
items) and the Hurtt (2010) Professional Skepticism Scale (5 items). At the end of experiment, 
manipulation check questions were asked and demographic information were gathered.  A 
complete text of the survey instrument is provided in Appendix A. 
 Experimental research has an advantage over archival research in capturing natural 
settings and measuring intervening variables in order to draw strong and reliable causal 
inferences (Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson, 2002).  It affords the opportunity to examine how, 
when, and why important features of the manipulated variables can influence an individual’s 
behavior (Trotman, 2011).  More specifically, Solomon and Trotman (2003, p.396) indicated that 
“experimental research is the most powerful method to study auditors’ judgments decisions.”  
The Task 
The research instrument of this study is based on instruments used in prior studies of time 
budget pressure (Coram et al., 2004; Gundry and Liyanarachchi, 2007) and client incentive 
pressure (Robertson, 2010).   The instrument consists of two parts. Part 1 provides background 
information about the client including general information, financial position, and a summary of 
key financial data. This information is the same for all versions of the instrument. 
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The experimental case introduces information about Taylor, a staff auditor assigned to 
work on an audit of GTL, a technology based client for Taylor’s audit firm. The case states that 
Taylor’s firm has audited this client for three years and has always given standard, unqualified 
opinions for both its financial statements and internal controls. In addition, the case mentions that 
this is Taylor’s first time working on the audit of GTL. Taylor has been asked to perform 
substantive testing for the accounts receivable audit.  
The next part of the case contains a discussion of the time budget for the audit and client 
incentive manipulations.  It indicates that when Taylor is testing a transaction, he finds one sale 
that does not have a sales report.  The accounts receivable in question involves one of GTL’s 
electronic product sales, which is a total of $1,200,000 (i.e., 6 cents of EPS). However, there is 
no sales report documenting this sale. When Taylor approaches GTL’s management about this 
problem, he is told the documents have been misplaced but management can vouch for the fact 
that the documents have been correctly recorded. To verify this, Taylor would have to contact an 
overseas customer. Taylor knows contacting this customer would take a considerable amount of 
time.  
The Dependent and Independent Variables 
 Similar to Coram et al. (2004) and Robertson (2010), participants were asked to indicate 
the likelihood that Taylor will spend additional effort to further investigate the questionable 
accounts receivable transaction. Participants’ judgments are measured on a scale from 1 to 7, 
where 1 = extremely unlikely and 7 = extremely likely.  As a second dependent variable, they 
assessed the level of material misstatement risk they think the auditor will associate with the 
transaction. They reported the risk on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 = extremely low risk, and 7 = 
extremely high risk. In addition, participants were asked to indicate the likelihood that Taylor 
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will accept the client’s explanation and not investigate the matter further as additional dependent 
variables. 
Independent Variable – Time Budget Pressure 
The level of time budget pressure variable is manipulated by describing characteristics of 
the audit resulting in “high time budget pressure” or “low time budget pressure” (Coram et al., 
2004; Gundry and Liyanarachchi, 2007). In the high time budget pressure condition, the client 
renegotiated audit fees and the audit partner decided to reduce the audit fees and budgeted hours. 
As a result, the total audit budgeted hours are cut by approximately 20%.  Moreover, the high 
time budget pressure case states that the auditor, Taylor, has reached the end of his time budget 
for this section of the audit, and that he is meeting the manager in charge of the audit to finalize 
this section. To verify the accounts receivable transaction in question, Taylor would have to ask 
the manager for more time. Taylor knows that the manager has denied extensions of time in 
other areas of the audit due to time budget constraints. 
In the low time budget pressure condition, the audit partner in charge decided to charge 
the same audit fee as last year (i.e., the audit fee will not increase or decrease this year), and he 
has allocated the same amount of hours to the audit that were budgeted last year. In previous 
years, the time budget has been reasonable for the amount of work involved, and the same 
amount of work is expected this year. Further, the low time budget case states that Taylor is 
meeting the manager in charge of the audit to discuss this accounts receivable section of the audit. 
Taylor may have to ask the manager for more time to verify the transaction. Taylor knows that 
the manager has granted extensions of time in other areas of the audit as the time budget is 
relatively flexible. 
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Independent Variable – Client Incentive Pressure 
Consistent with Roberson (2010), client incentive pressure is manipulated at low and 
high levels by using both a corporate (meeting the EPS forecast) and personal (receiving a bonus) 
incentive. In the case, the client executives’ bonus is dependent on whether the company meets 
or exceeds its EPS forecast. In the high incentive pressure condition, if the receivable in question 
is written off, then the company will miss its EPS forecast and the client’s executives will not 
receive a bonus. In the low incentive pressure condition, the company will still meet its EPS 
forecast and the executives will receive a bonus even if the accounting receivable in question is 
written off.  
Moderating Measured Variable - EI  
 EI was measured using the 16-item version of the Workgroup Emotional Intelligence 
Profile (WEIP) scale (Jordan and Lawrence, 2009). Many measures of EI have been used in 
management and organizational behavior research (e.g., Jordan and Lawrence, 2009; Cherniss, 
2010).  For example, based on the framework from Mayer and Salovey (1997), the Multi-
Factorial Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS) is an ability test used to measure EI by evaluation 
of actual performance on multiple tasks (Mayer et al., 2000; Cherniss, 2010). However, 
questions regarding the validity and reliability of this measure have been raised due to its 
correlation with some personality measures (Davies, Stankov. and Roberts, 1998). A second 
measure of EI is Bar-On’s Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i), which is a self-reported 
measure of emotionally and socially intelligent behavior (Bar-On, 2006). However, some argue 
that the EQ-i examines overall psychological well-being, rather than EI (Jordan et al., 2002).  
One potential issue for EI measurements is the assumption that EI remains constant 
across situations.  The WEIP is based on the framework developed by Mayer and Salovey (1997).  
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The self-reported measure consists of 2 subscales: the ability to deal with one’s own emotions, 
and the ability to deal with others’ emotions. The WEIP has been shown to have convergent 
validity by examining the correlations between the WEIP and other existing measures.  
Specifically, the WEIP is positively correlated with the acquisitive self-monitoring scale and two 
subcomponents of the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (clarity of moods, repair of moods), and 
negatively correlated with the personal distress scale (Jordan et al., 2002).  Furthermore, the 
WEIP has been found to be an appropriate self-reported measure as it incrementally predicts job 
performance above and beyond over cognitive ability and personality traits (O’Boyle et al., 
2010). Moreover, the WEIP has lower correlations with cognitive ability and personality traits 
than other EI measures.  It is for these reasons that I chose to use Jordan’s measure of EI, the 
WEIP, in my study.  
         Jordan and Lawrence (2009) designed a 16-item short-version of the WEIP.  This version 
measures four distinct components of EI: awareness of one’s own emotions, management of 
one’s emotions, awareness of others’ emotions, and management of others’ emotions (see Figure 
2). The reported Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for these dimensions are 0.85, 0.77, 0.81, and 
0.81, respectively.  This short version of WEIP is  used in the current study to measure auditors’ 
EI. Some examples of EI items include: “I can explain the emotions I feel to team members,” 
and “I respect the opinion of team members, even if I think they are wrong.”  
 To identify the level of EI for each participant in this study, I used the median scores of 
EI as cut-off points, which is a common method used in previous studies (Angelisdis and 
Ibrahim, 2011; Marques and Azevedo-Perira, 2012). Participants who scored above the median 
were classified as “high” EI. Those scoring below the median were classified as “low” EI. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
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Control Variables: Professional Skepticism and Years of Experience 
Based on Hurtt (2010) and Robertson (2010), the professional skepticism scale (PS) 
includes the following five items: “I often question things that clients tell me,” “I require proof 
that my clients’ statements are true,” “I am cautious when evaluating information obtained from 
clients,” “Clients are generally honest (reverse item),” and “I tend to trust what clients tell me 
(reverse item).” The PS items are measured on seven-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1 = 
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.  The PS score is the mean of these five items with a 
higher score indicating greater skepticism. Robertson (2010) reports a Cronbach's alpha for PS as 
0.64.  
Auditors’ years of experience is also included as a control variable, because prior 
research has shown auditor judgment is influenced by the extent of the auditors’ professional 
experience (Asare et al., 2009). That is, more experienced auditors are more aware of litigation 
risk and less likely to be affected by client pressure. Moreover, there is a negative relation 
between auditor experience and the influence of emotions on their judgment (Bhattacharjee and 
Moreno, 2002; Bhattacharjee et al., 2011).  Although all participants in this study are lower rank 
auditors, there may be differences between participants based solely on experience.  Hence, I 
include years of experience as a control variable. 
Manipulation Checks 
 After several questions related to the dependent variables, two manipulation check 
questions were provided to ensure that the participants had attended to the details of the case.  
First, a client incentive manipulation question is asked. This question asks participants to 
indicate the impact of writing off the entire accounts receivable in question on the ability of the 
client to meet the consensus analysts’ EPS forecast. Participants can select either “exceed” or 
“miss” the analyst forecast. A second manipulation check question concerns the level of time 
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budget pressure in the case. Participants indicated whether or not the audit partner decided to cut 
the total audit budget hours by approximately 20%. 
In addition, participants were asked several questions about the case. For example, 
participants assessed the incentive of client management to misstate the sale on a seven-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = extremely low to 7= extremely high. Participants were also 
asked to indicate the overall level of stress that Taylor experienced in this case on a scale of 1 to 
7.   
Pilot Testing and Translation 
Initial pilot testing  
 The instrument was reviewed by a former Big-4 auditor to determine whether the case 
scenario was realistic. To ascertain the clarity of the instrument and to provide preliminary 
evidence of the effectiveness of the experimental manipulations, pilot tests were conducted with 
senior-level auditing students from a large state university in the eastern United States. Because 
of the timing of the experiment (end of the semester), it is believed that these senior-level 
auditing students should possess adequate auditing knowledge to complete the experiment and be 
reasonable surrogates for lower level auditors. In addition, prior research indicates that students 
are likely to be good surrogates for ‘real-world’ individuals with respect to decision-making 
behaviors (Libby et al., 2002; Liyanarachchi and Milne, 2005; Liyanarachchi, 2007). For 
example, Ashton and Kramer (1980, p. 11) investigated the decision-making judgment of both 
auditors and accounting students, and found that “students were adequate surrogates for the 
auditors.” Similarly, Norman (1998) reports that both accounting students and internal auditors 
provide similar opinions when asked to assess fraudulent behavior.  
 Initial pilot tests results were analyzed to determine whether the independent variables, as 
manipulated in the instrument, were understandable. The results indicated participant confusion 
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regarding the client incentive pressure manipulation. Finally, the instrument was revised and the 
manipulation was reworded.  
Translation 
 The back-translation method was used for translating the revised experimental instrument 
into Mandarin Chinese. An English version of the instrument was independently translated into 
Chinese by two bi-lingual Chinese individuals who obtained Ph.D. degrees in the United States. 
After minor differences were resolved, the resulting Chinese version of the instrument was 
translated back into English by a bi-lingual Chinese professor who teaches English at a 
university in China. The back-translated English version was compared to the pre-translation 
English version to ensure that no inconsistencies occurred from the translation process.  
Secondary pilot testing 
After translating the revised instrument, a second pilot test was conducted with seventy 
senior accounting students in China. These participants had just completed an auditing course 
and were working at accounting firms as interns. The purpose of this second pilot test was to 
examine the clarity of the translated instrument and revised manipulation of client incentive 
pressures.  
The results from the second pilot test indicated that the instrument and the manipulated 
variable were clearly understood by participants. Only five students failed the manipulation 
check questions. Further, the pilot test indicated that the independent variable manipulations 
significantly impacted participants’ responses to the dependent variables. Specifically, there was 
a significant difference in the mean reported likelihood of further investigation between low and 
high time budget pressure (p = 0.02). In addition, the mean reported likelihood of further 
investigation was significantly higher under high client incentive pressure than under low client 
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incentive pressure (Mean= 4.0 vs. 2.9, t= -3.65, p = 0.001). Finally, the pilot test results 
indicated a significant interaction between the two independent variables. Thus, the results from 
pilot testing indicated effective manipulations of the two independent variables and provided 
preliminary results consistent with the hypothesized responses.  
Data Collection  
The final instrument was distributed to lower rank auditors (staff accountants and audit 
seniors) in eastern China. There are two reasons this study focuses on staff and senior auditors. 
First, staff and seniors have less experience than more senior auditors, such as managers and 
partners. Bhattacharjee and Moreno (2002) and Bhattacharjee et al. (2011) report a negative 
relation between auditor experience and the influence of emotions on audit judgment. Second, 
lower rank auditors are responsible for the actual audit fieldwork, which is important to the audit 
process and provides the foundation for the audit opinion (Stefaniak and Robertson, 2010).  
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Chapter IV 
Results 
Participants 
 Two-hundred auditors employed at auditing firms in China participated in the study. Ten 
respondents either failed the manipulation checks or did not complete the experiment, resulting 
in a final sample of 190 auditors. Eighty-four percent of the retained participants are employed 
by Big-4 firms and 16 percent are employees of national accounting firms in China. 
Demographic Information 
 Of the 190 participants included in the analyses, 52.6 percent are female and the mean 
age is 26 years. All participants report completion of either 4-year undergraduate or masters 
degrees. Participants’ mean professional experience is 2.41 years (range 1 to 5 years) and the 
mean tenure with their current organization is 2.21 years. Half of the participants (50 percent) are 
audit seniors and half are audit staff. In addition, the majority of the participants (77 percent) are 
certified by the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPAs), and eight 
individuals hold other accounting professional certifications in China. Participants indicated that 
time budgets are attainable with effort in their organizations (mean response of 5.41 out of a 7-
point scale) and that it is very important for them to meet these time budgets (mean response of 
5.62, range from 5 to 7). Finally, participants indicated a high level of job stress in their 
organizations (mean response of 5.41 out of a 7-point scale). Table 1 presents participants’ 
demographic data.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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Manipulation Checks 
 Of the 200 participants, 190 passed both the time budget pressure and the incentive 
manipulation checks. Participants who either failed at least one manipulation check or did not 
complete the entire instrument were eliminated for the purposes of the main statistical tests. 
Specifically, seven and three participants provided incorrect responses to the client incentive 
pressure and time budget pressure manipulation checks, respectively.  
 Another way of checking the effectiveness of the time budget pressure manipulation is to 
ask the level of time budget pressure that Taylor experienced in the case. Participants correctly 
indicated a higher mean pressure in the high time budget pressure treatment (Mean = 5.51, SD = 
0.92) than in the low pressure treatment (Mean = 3.03, SD = 0.83; t = 19.40, p ≤ 0.001). Thus, 
the manipulation successfully induced perceptions of time budget pressure. Also, participants 
reported a mean client pressure level of 5.31(SD = 1.19) in the high client incentive pressure 
treatment and 4.17(SD = 1.27) in the low client pressure treatment (t = 6.36, p ≤ 0.001) 
indicating an effective manipulation of client incentive pressure.  
Descriptive Statistics  
Dependent and independent variables 
 Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the likelihood of further 
investigation of the questionable transaction. Across treatments, the mean level of further 
investigation was 4.02, where 4 equals “neutral” on the scale of response options. Thus, auditors 
indicated a neutral likelihood of spending additional time and effort to investigate accounts 
receivable further. In contrast to H1, a lower mean likelihood of further investigation was 
reported by the low time budget pressure treatment group (Mean = 3.51, SD = 1.225) than by the 
high time pressure treatment group (Mean = 4.44, SD =1.538; t = 11.359, p ≤ 0.001). However, 
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these results must be interpreted with caution due to the significant interactions described below 
(Figures 9 & 10). As predicted by H2b, the likelihood of additional investigation is higher under 
high client incentive condition (Mean = 4.54, SD=1.53) than under the low client incentive 
condition (Mean = 3.27, SD =1.002; t = 31.72, p ≤  0.001).  
Panel B of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the perceived level of risk 
associated with this transaction. The mean level of risk was 4.27 across treatments, where 
1equals “low risk” and 5 equals “high risk” on the scale of response options. Thus, participants 
felt that there was a moderate level of material misstatement risk associated with the 
questionable account receivable transaction. The assessed risk level was higher under the high 
time budget pressure treatment than under the low time budget pressure treatment (Mean = 4.74 
vs. 3.70, t = 18.44, p ≤  0.001). Similar results are found in client incentive treatment. The risk 
assessment is significantly higher when participants experienced high client incentive pressure 
than when participants experienced low client incentive pressure (Mean = 4.87 vs. 3.41; t 
=25.276, p ≤  0.001) providing initial support of H2b.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
EI and PS measures 
Overall, the mean EI score was 63.2 and the median was 55.5 (total score equals 112).  
The 95 participants who had scores above the median are classified as “high” EI, while the other 
half of participants scoring below the median are classified as “low” EI for the analysis. The 
mean level of PS was 4.22, SD= 1.256, which is lower than that reported in Robertson (2008) 
(the mean was above 5.5). It may be affected by the culture factor since culture influences 
auditor professional skepticism and judgment in high power distance countries (Endrawes and 
Monroe, 2010). 
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Additionally, there is the significant correlation between EI and PS (r= 0.77; α =0.01; 
two-tailed). The mean professional skepticism scores are significantly different across the two 
levels of EI. Specifically, the high EI group has a higher mean professional skepticism score than 
the low EI group (Mean = 5.30 high EI group vs. 3.41 low EI group; t = 14.98, p ≤ 0.001). To 
reexamine whether PS affected the results of hypothesis testing, a one way ANOVA model was 
used and the results show the significant effect of PS on auditor judgment.  
Hypothesis Tests 
 In initial analysis, all demographic variables are examined for inclusion as control 
variables in the analyses. However, gender and education are not significantly related to the 
dependent variables. Additionally, since age and audit experience are highly correlated (r = 0.88, 
p = 0.01), age is not included as a variable in the main analyses. Thus, the final models include 
only Professional skepticism (PS) and years of experience (Years) as control variables.  
I employ a systematic progression of multivariate general linear models in this study to 
test the hypotheses. PS and Years are included in all equations for the analysis. Equation 1 
examines whether time budget pressure (TB) has an influence on auditor judgments (AJi). 
Equation 2 examines whether client incentive pressure (CI) has an influence on AJi. Equation 3 
adds TB, CI, and the interaction between these two independent variables to the model.  
AJi = α0 + α1TB + α2PS + α3Years + εi                                                                      (1) 
AJi = β0 + β1CI + β3PS + β3Years + εi                                                                       (2) 
AJi = ρ0 + ρ1TB + ρ2CI + ρ3CI*TB + ρ4PS + ρ5Years + εi             (3) 
where, AJi = Auditor judgments; Two dependent variables, likelihood of investigating further 
 (AJ1) and level of material misstatement risk (AJ2), each measured used a 7-point Likert 
 scale where1 = Extremely Unlikely and 7 = Extremely Likely; 
 TB = Time budget pressure; Dichotomous independent variable equal to 0 if time  budget 
 pressure is low or 1 if time budget pressure is high; 
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CI = Client incentive pressure; Dichotomous independent variable equal to 0 if client 
 incentive pressure is low or 1 if client incentive pressure is high; 
PS = Professional skepticism; Mean participant professional skepticism score ranging 
 from 1 = low skepticism to 7 = high skepticism; and 
Years = Years of work experience, 
 Moderation analysis is also used to test the hypotheses posed in this study. According to 
Frazier, Tix and Barron (2004, p.116), “moderators address ‘when’ or ‘for whom’ a variable 
most strongly predicts or causes an outcome variable.” A moderator changes the direction or 
strength of the relation between a predictor and an outcome (Frazier et al., 2004). This study tests 
whether EI moderates the relation between pressure and auditor judgment. Thus emotional 
intelligence is expected to mitigate the effects of pressure on auditor judgment (H4-H6).  
 Moderated multivariate analysis is the statistical tool of choice for estimating interaction 
effects in the organizational sciences (Aguinis and Gottfredson, 2010). The moderation analysis 
used to test H4-H6 includes two independent variables, time budget pressure and client incentive 
pressure, the dependent variable, a measure of EI, and control variables. According to Aguinis 
and Gottfredson (2010), I use the interaction term between EI and the other independent 
variables to test for moderation. The following equations are estimated: 
AJi = α0 + α1TB + α2EI + α3TB*EI + α4PS + α5Years + εi                                                                    (4) 
AJi = β0 + β1CI + β2EI + β3 CI*EI + β3PS + β3Years + εi                                                                      (5) 
            AJi = ρ0 + ρ1TB + ρ2CI + ρ3EI + ρ4TB*EI + ρ5CI* EI + ρ6TB*CI +  
        ρ7TB*CI*EI + ρ8PS + ρ9Years + εi                                                                                                            (6) 
where, AJi = Auditor judgments; Two dependent variables, likelihood of investigating further 
 (AJ1) and level of material misstatement risk (AJ2), each measured used a 7-point Likert 
 scale where1 = Extremely Unlikely and 7 = Extremely Likely; 
 TB = Time budget pressure; Dichotomous independent variable equal to 0 if time  budget                   
            pressure is low or 1 if time budget pressure is high; 
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CI = Client incentive pressure; Dichotomous independent variable equal to 0 if client 
 incentive pressure is low or 1 if client incentive pressure is high; 
EI = Emotional Intelligence; Dichotomous independent variable equal to 0 if emotional 
 intelligence is low or 1 if emotional intelligence is high;  
PS = Professional skepticism; Mean participant professional skepticism score ranging 
 from 1 = low skepticism to 7 = high skepticism; and 
Years = Years of work experience. 
 Equations 1- 3 progressively examine the impact of time budget pressure and client 
incentive pressure on audit judgments, ignoring EI. Equations 4-6 allow for a test of the 
moderating effect of EI on our understanding of these relations. It is important to note that the 
conclusions that would be drawn in regard to H1, H2, and H3 based on the analyses differ once 
EI is included. The best interpretation of the data occurs when the significant interactions in the 
final model (equation 6) are taken into account (see Table 8). Thus, the progressive analysis 
presented in this dissertation provides an important illustration of how EI can significantly 
impact and clarify our understanding of the relations between these pressures and auditor 
judgments. Thus, I will first discuss the evidence provided for the first three hypotheses from 
analyses based on equations 1-3. Then I will discuss the analyses based on Equations 4-6 and the 
overall evidence regarding the hypotheses presented in this study. 
Preliminary tests of H1-H3 based on equations 1-3 
Equation 1 investigates the impact of time budget pressure on auditor judgments using a 
MANCOVA performed using the multivariate general linear model function of SPSS. The 
assessment of risk and the likelihood of investigating further are the dependent auditor judgment 
variables. Table 3 presents the results. There is a significant main effect for time budget pressure 
for both dependent variables. Interestingly, auditors assessed the questionable transaction as less 
risky (F= 21.517, p < 0.001), and are less likely to investigate it further (F= 9.465, p = 0.002) 
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when they experience less time budget pressure. This result suggests that auditors are more likely 
to be aware of misstatement risk and request more time for investigating a questionable 
transaction when they experience high time budget pressure. The first hypothesis predicts that 
auditors will make more conservative judgments when they experience less time budget pressure. 
Thus, the results presented in Table 3 do not support H1.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 Table 4 reports the analysis described by equation 2. This analysis indicates that there is a 
significant main effect of client incentive pressure on the assessment of risk and the likelihood of 
investigating further (F=73.682 & 40.571, p ≤ 0.001). That is, auditors assessed the transaction 
as more risky and are more likely to investigate further when the client has high incentives to 
influence the auditor. This result is consistent with H2b and with results reported by Robertson 
(2010) who posits that a client’s incentive to manage earnings may lead auditors to be more 
skeptical and collect more evidence on clients’ reporting. Thus, as the client’s incentive 
increases, auditors are more likely to make conservative judgments.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 H3 predicts that auditor judgment will be influenced by time budget pressure to a greater 
extent when client incentive pressure is absent than when client incentive pressure is present. 
The MANCOVA analysis of equation 3 is shown in Table 5. The interaction between time 
budget pressure and client incentive pressure is not significant in explaining the likelihood of 
investigating further (F=2.579,  p = 0.11) and is insignificant in explaining risk assessment (F= 
0.395,  p = 0.53). Thus, the results reported in Table 5 fail to provide support for H3.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the interaction in relation to the likelihood of additional 
investigation and assessment of risk, respectively. Although the interactions are insignificant, 
these graphical depictions give us some evidence of the patterns underlying the data. Figure 3 
illustrates that the difference in the likelihood of investigating further between time budget 
pressure treatments appears to be greater under low client incentive pressure than under high 
client incentive pressure. In other words, when auditors experienced low client incentive pressure, 
the level of time budget pressure has a greater effect on the likelihood of further investigation. 
Furthermore, the level of material misstatement risk is highest when auditors experience both 
high time budget pressure and high client incentive pressure (Figure 4). 
[Insert Figure 3 and Figure 4 about here] 
Preliminary tests of H4 and H5 based on equations 4 and 5 
 H4 predicts that auditors with high EI will make more conservative judgments than 
auditors with low EI when they are exposed to time budget pressure. As an initial investigation, I 
use independent sample T-tests to assess the effect of EI on auditor judgments. Auditors’ risk 
5.01 vs. 3.53, t = 9.195, p ≤  0.001). Participants high in EI are also significantly more likely to 
investigate the questionable transaction further than those with low in EI (Mean = 5.09 vs. 2.95, t 
= 14.610, p ≤  0.001). Consistent with H4, these results suggest a positive, significant association 
between EI and conservative auditor judgments. 
Equation 4 presents an analysis of emotional intelligence in combination with time 
budget pressure on auditor judgments. The results, reported in Table 6, indicate that EI 
significantly influences both auditor judgments (F = 60.476 further investigation; 21.261 risk 
level; p ≤ 0.001). Moreover, the interaction of time budget pressure and EI is significant for 
further investigation (F = 9.559, p = 0.002), and is marginally significant for auditors’ 
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assessments of risk (F =4.566, p = 0.034). Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the interactions between time 
budget pressure and emotional intelligence reported in Table 6. Participants who are high in EI 
assess higher risk and are more likely to investigate the transaction further. In other words, 
auditors high in EI are more conservative in comparison to those low in EI when they experience 
pressures at work. Thus, EI has a moderating effect on auditor judgment under time budget 
pressure.  
[Insert Table 6, Figure 5, and Figure 6 about here] 
 The fifth hypothesis (H5) predicts that EI has a moderation effect on auditor judgment 
when auditors are exposed to client incentive pressure. Equation 5 specifically analyzes 
emotional intelligence and client incentive pressure. As can be seen from the MANCOVA 
analysis presented in Table 7, the main effects of CI and EI are significant for both dependent 
variables (p ≤ 0.001). In addition, the significant interaction between CI and EI indicates 
moderation effects for the likelihood of further investigation (F = 32.966, p ≤ 0.001) and auditors’ 
risk assessments (F = 38.645, p ≤ 0.001). As Figure 7 shows, participants who are high in EI are 
more likely to further investigate whether or not they are subject to client incentive pressure. 
However, the difference between high and low EI auditors is greater when they experience high 
client incentive pressure. Similarly, as Figure 8 illustrates, auditors who are high in EI assess 
higher misstatement risk (Mean = 4.78) than those who are low in EI (Mean = 3.72), and this 
difference is greater under high client incentive pressure (t = 9.195, p ≤ 0.001). In sum, these 
results support H5.  
[Insert Table 7, Figure 7, and Figure 8 about here] 
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Tests of the hypotheses based on equation 6 
The last hypothesis states that auditors with high EI will make more conservative 
judgments than auditors with low EI when they are exposed to both time budget and client 
incentive pressure. In order to test H6, equation 6 examines EI, TB, CI, and the interactions of 
these variables. Table 8 presents the results of this MANCOVA analysis. The results indicate 
that when auditors’ risk assessments are the dependent variable of interest, there is a significant 
three-way interaction among EI, TB, and CI (F = 19.593, p ≤ 0.001). Moreover, the three-way 
interaction is significant when considering auditors’ likelihood of investigating further (F = 
3.353, p = 0. 069).  
Additionally, the two-way interaction of TB and CI is significant on explaining auditors’ 
likelihood of further investigation (F = 6.507, p ≤ 0.001) and not on risk assessment ((F = 0.256, 
p = 0.613), which provide partial support of H3. The moderation effect of EI is only significant 
on likelihood of further investigation (F = 11.187, p ≤ 0.001), and marginal significant on risk 
assessment (F = 2.824, p ≤ 0.095). Thus, H4 is supported. Similarly, H5 is supported by the 
significant interaction on both dependent variables (F= 38.671 on Further Investigation and F= 
46.920 on risk assessment, p ≤ 0.001). Finally, the results indicate significant main effects for 
both independent variables (time budget pressure and client incentive pressure) and EI on both of 
the dependent variables (p ≤ 0.001).  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Understanding the significant interactions presented in Table 8 is key to fully 
understanding the data from this study and in testing the hypotheses. According to Kirk (1995), 
tests of simple main-effects can be used to explain a three-way interaction. For this study, the 
three-way interaction can be better understood by testing the effects of client and time pressures 
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for individuals with high EI separately from individuals with low EI. To further simplify the 
analysis, I present the results of an ANCOVA for each dependent variable. The main results are 
the same under both the ANCOVA and the overall MANCOVA analyses. The ANCOVAs are 
presented in Tables 9-12 and the interactions from these ANCOVAs are illustrated in Figures 9-
12.  
EI level and auditor risk assessment 
 The ANCOVA results presented in Table 9 and Table 10 clarify this three-way 
interaction by separating low EI from high EI. The ANCOVA results in Table 9 report low EI 
auditor risk assessments. For this group, the F ratio of the three way interaction is 9.2592. To 
provide a more conservative assessment of significance, I calculate the adjusted p–value using 
the per family error rate method to determine the critical value for tests of simple main-effects 
(Kirk, 1995). I divide the alpha level, 0.05, by 2 as I need two tests of simple main-effects. The 
critical value of (0.05/2=0.025; df=1; n=89) is 3.836. As the F ratio of the three-way interaction, 
10.433, exceeds this critical value, the results suggest that the interaction between time budget 
pressure and client incentive pressure is statistically significant for the low EI group.  
Table 10 reports risk assessments for the high EI group. As the calculated F ratio is 
11.8893, it is greater than the critical value of 3.836,  the interaction continues to be significant 
based on an adjusted p-value. It is also interesting to note that when the two levels of EI are 
separated, the interactions between time budget pressure and client incentive pressure differ 
significantly across the levels of EI. This result is consistent with H6. 
[Insert Table 9 and Table 10 about here] 
                                                          
2  F ratio is calculated by mean square of the interaction from table 9, 4.546 divided by mean square error 
calculated from table 8, 0.491 (Kirk, 1995).  
3 F ratio is calculated by mean square of the interaction from table 10, 5.734 divided by mean square error 
calculated from table 8, 0.467. 
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  Figure 9 and Figure 10 graphically depict the interactions reported in Table 9 and Table 
10. The plots clarify the underlying cause of the significant three-way interaction between EI, CI 
and TB reported in Table 8. Specifically, auditors demonstrate different patterns of risk 
assessments in response to time budget pressure and client incentive pressure across the two 
levels of EI. In the low EI group, the difference in the level of risk assessment due to time budget 
pressure is greater when client incentive pressure is absent (Figure 9). Auditors with low EI 
assesses similar risk in both high and low time budget pressure conditions when client incentive 
pressure is present. This behavior is predicted by H3.  
[Insert Figure 9 about here] 
 More importantly, Figure 10 illustrates that auditors with high EI assess the highest risk 
of material misstatement when both time budget pressure and client incentive pressure are 
present. It is worthwhile to note that the effect of time budget pressure is greater when client 
incentive pressure is high, inconsistent with H3. When external (client’s incentive) pressure and 
internal (time budget) pressure increase, auditors with high EI become more skeptical and assess 
higher risk than those with low EI. This phenomenon may be due to the high correlation of high 
EI and professional skepticism (r= 0.77, p ≤ 0.01). Thus, it appears that high EI auditors exercise 
professional skepticism when faced with time budget and client incentive pressure leading them 
to assess greater risk. A similar pattern does not occur for low EI auditors. 
[Insert Figure 10 about here] 
EI level and likelihood of further investigation 
 The MANCOVA in Table 8 reports a marginal significant three-way interaction among 
time budget pressure, client incentive pressure and EI when further investigation is used as the 
dependent variable (p = 0.069). Thus, the expectation is that the interactions between time 
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budget pressure and client incentive pressure will reveal different patterns of behavior for both 
low and high EI auditors. The ANCOVA results in Table 11 and Table 12 report low EI and high 
EI auditors’ reported likelihood of further investigation, respectively.  
The ANCOVA results in Table 11 report the likelihood of investigating further for low EI 
auditors. For this group, the F ratio of the three way interaction is 19.2324. Again, to provide a 
more conservative assessment of significance, I compare this to the critical value of 3.836 as 
described above. As the F value exceeds this critical value, therefore, the results suggest that the 
interaction between time budget pressure and client incentive pressure is statistically significant 
for the low EI group. Figure 11 illustrates this interaction, showing that auditors with low EI are 
more likely to investigate further when they experience high client incentive pressure and low 
time budget pressure. This behavior is consistent with H3.   
[Insert Table 11 and Figure 11 about here] 
 However, a different pattern of behavior is observed in the high EI group. As Table 12 
reveals, while the main effects of time budget pressure and client incentive pressure are 
significant (F = 38.542 & 117.625; p ≤ 0.001), the interaction between the two independent 
variables is non-significant (F ratio is 1.1525 < critical value). This interaction is illustrated in 
Figure 12. The likelihood of further investigation is highest when participants are exposed to 
high client incentive pressure and high time budget pressure. In other words, the higher the 
pressures, the more likely it is that high EI auditors will investigate the questionable transaction 
further. This result is similar to what was observed for high EI auditor risk assessments (e.g., 
compare Figure 10 and Figure 12). If one takes both dependent variables into consideration it 
                                                          
4 F ratio is calculated by mean square of the interaction calculated from table 11, 9.443 divided by mean 
square error calculated from table 8, 0.491. 
5 F ratio is calculated by mean square of the interaction calculated from table 12, 0.538 divided by mean 
square error calculated from table 8, 0.467. 
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suggests that high EI participants assessed higher risk and are therefore more likely to investigate 
further with regard to the questionable transaction when they are exposed to both internal and 
external pressures at work. Table 13 presents the summary results of the hypotheses.  
[Insert Table 12, Table 13, and Figure 12 about here] 
Supplemental Analyses 
 In order to better understand the moderation effects of EI, several additional questions 
were asked in the experimental instrument to evaluate the auditor judgments. These questions 
were measured on seven-point Likert scales and are described in more detail in the Method 
Chapter.  
Stress level  
 Participants are asked to indicate the extent of overall stress that Taylor experienced in 
this case. They indicate an average stress level of 4.46 (SD = 1.41). Participants correctly 
indicate higher stress when subject to high levels of time budget pressure or client incentive 
pressure (Mean = 5.33 high time budget pressure treatment vs. 3.42 low time budget pressure 
treatment, t = 12.76, p ≤ 0.001; Mean = 4.97 high client incentive pressure treatment vs. 3.73 low 
client incentive pressure treatment, t = 6.44, p ≤ 0.001). Additionally, there is a significant 
difference in perceived stress level between the high and low EI groups (Mean = 4.67 vs. 4.25, t 
= 2.072, p ≤ 0.04).  
 Participants are also asked to indicate the level of pressure to keep the client happy. The 
mean response is 4.84 (SD = 1.34). Consistent with the manipulation, pressure to keep the client 
happy is perceived to be significantly higher by auditors in the high client incentive pressure 
treatments (t = 6.36, p ≤ 0.001).  
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Incentives for misstatement  
Prior research asserts that client incentives to misstate decrease their credibility from the 
auditor’s perspective. As a result, auditors are more likely to act conservatively when they are 
aware that clients have incentives to misstate (Robertson, 2010). In order to assess the effect of 
client incentives on auditor judgment, participants are asked to measure their perceptions of the 
client’s incentive for misstatement (Mean = 4.25, SD = 1.35). High EI auditors are significantly 
more aware of clients’ incentives for misstatement (Mean = 4.78) than low EI auditors (Mean = 
3.72, t = 5.883, p ≤ 0.001). Consequently, high EI auditors make more conservative judgments as 
is observed in the previously described results (consistent with H6).  
Risk of loss 
 To obtain information about participants’ perceptions of litigation risk associated with the 
case, participants assess the loss risk that the auditor’s firm will suffer as a consequence of this 
audit. Table 14, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for auditors’ loss risk assessments grouped 
by independent variable. As can be seen from the ANOVA presented in Panel B of Table 14, 
both independent variables significantly influence loss risk perceptions (TB-F =44.402, CI-
F=158.384; p ≤ 0.001). Moreover, the interaction between the two independent variables is 
significant (F = 6.187; p = 0.014). In other words, auditors’ perceptions of loss risk are 
dependent upon the pressures they associate with the situation. I also find that loss risk 
assessment is positively associated with the level of EI (Mean = 4.54 high EI group vs. 3.58 low 
EI group, t = 6.12, p ≤ 0.001).  
[Insert Table 14 about here] 
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Additional measures of auditor judgment 
 Two additional dependent measures are used to test whether the main effects of EI on 
auditor judgment are robust. Similar to the primary dependent variables, participants were asked 
to indicate the likelihood that Taylor will ask the manager in charge for extra time before making 
a final recommendation. In addition, participants were asked to indicate the likelihood that 
Taylor will accept the client’s explanation and not investigate the matter further as described in 
the Method Chapter. This variable has an inverse relation with conservative auditor judgment. 
That is, the higher the likelihood of accepting the client’s explanation, the less conservative the 
judgment.  
A MANCOVA test was used to test the main hypotheses on these two additional 
dependent variables (see Table 15). First, the control variable professional skepticism is 
significant (F = 5.816 on Requesting time, p =0.017; 19.867 on Accepting explanation; p ≤ 0.001) 
and audit experience is marginally significant on both additional dependent variables (F = 2.734 
on Requesting time, p = 0.01; 3.964 on Accepting explanation; p =0.048). Second, the 
independent variables are significant p ≤ 0.01, consistent with H1 and H2. The results of the 
MANCOVA reported in Table 15 also indicate that EI significantly moderates the impact of the 
pressure variables on both additional dependent variables (F =54.195 on Requesting time; 21.647 
on Accepting explanation ; p ≤ 0.001). In addition, independent T-tests indicate that, as 
compared to low EI auditors, high EI auditors are less likely to accept the client’s explanation 
(Mean = 3.53 vs. 5.01, t = -12.399, p ≤ 0.001) and are more likely to ask the manager for extra 
time before making a final recommendation (Mean = 4.79 vs. 2.49, t = 16.461, p ≤ 0.001). In 
other words, EI reduces auditors’ tendency to engage in dysfunctional behaviors promoted by 
pressure, such as accepting weak client explanations.  
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[Insert Table 15 about here] 
Furthermore, the interaction between the two independent variables has a significant 
effect on auditors’ willingness to request extra time (F =18.960, p ≤ 0.001), but not on their 
propensity to accept the client’s explanation (F = 0.254, p = 0.615). These results partially 
support H3 indicating that auditor judgment will be influenced by time budget pressure 
differently when client incentive pressure is absent rather than present.  
Inconsistent with H4, neither dependent variable is influenced by the interaction of time 
budget pressure and EI. Both acceptance of the client’s explanation and likelihood of requesting 
extra time are not affected by the interaction of client incentive pressure and EI (F = 1.797, p = 
0.182; F = .281, p = 0.597 respectively). Finally, there is a significant three-way interaction on 
auditors’ willingness to request extra time (F = 9.084, p = 0.003), but not on their acceptance of 
the client’s explanation (F = 1.474, p = 0.226). In order to better understand the three-way 
interaction, separate ANCOVA tests for low and high EI groups are performed for each of the 
dependent measures.  
EI level and willingness to request additional time 
Table 16 and Table 17 report the ANCOVA results for auditors’ willingness to request 
extra time, and Figure 13 & 14 illustrate the mean responses. The interaction of client incentive 
pressure and time budget pressure is significant for auditors with low EI (F = 76.9366 > critical 
value of 3.836) and is not significant for auditors with high EI (F = 1.2387 < critical value). It is 
interesting to note that auditors with low EI indicate a higher likelihood of requesting extra time 
to gather additional audit evidence if they are exposed to low time budget pressure and high 
                                                          
6 F ratio is calculated by mean square of the interaction calculated from table 16, 36.706 divided by mean 
square error calculated from table15, 0.4771. 
7 F ratio is calculated by mean square of the interaction calculated from table 17, 0.770 divided by mean 
square error calculated from table15, 0.622. 
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client incentive pressure (Figure 13). However, Figure 14 indicates auditors with high EI are 
more likely to request extra time before making a final recommendation when the client has high 
incentive to influence the auditor than when the client has low incentive. Accordingly, EI 
moderates how external and internal pressures influence auditor judgment.  
[Insert Table 16, Table 17, Figure 13, and Figure 14 about here] 
EI level and the likelihood of accepting the client’s explanation 
 Table 18 and Table 19 report the ANCOVA results for auditors’ likelihood of accepting 
the client’s explanation, and Figure 15 and Figure 16 illustrate the mean responses. For low EI 
auditors, time budget pressure significantly interact with client incentive pressure to influence 
low EI auditors’ likelihood of accepting the client’s explanation (F ratio 2.0138 < critical value of 
3.386). As Figure 15 illustrates, low EI auditors report a higher likelihood of accepting the 
client’s explanation when the client has low incentive to influence the auditors. 
[Insert Table 18 and Figure 15 about here] 
 Table 19 reports that time budget pressure significantly impacts high EI auditors’ 
likelihood of accepting client explanation (F =8.375, p ≤ 0.001). The lower the time budget 
pressure, the more likely the auditor will accept the client’s explanation. The interaction between 
the two independent variables is not significant (F= 0.3789 < critical value). Figure 16 illustrates 
that the difference between the likelihood of accepting the client’s explanation due to time 
budget pressure is similar under both low and high client incentive pressure. In other words, high 
EI auditors consider both internal and external pressures before exercising their judgment. High 
EI auditors are least likely to accept the client’s explanation when they are subject to both high 
                                                          
8 F ratio is calculated by mean square of the interaction calculated from table 18, 0.961 divided by mean 
square error calculated from table16, 0.4771. 
9 F ratio is calculated by mean square of the interaction calculated from table 19, 0.235 divided by mean 
square error calculated from table17, 0.622. 
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time budget pressure and high client incentive pressure. In sum, different behavior patterns are 
observed between high and low EI auditors, a finding consistent with H6.  
[Insert Table 19 and Figure 16 about here] 
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Chapter IIV 
Summary and Conclusions 
Summary  
 Prior accounting research recognizes the importance of the impact of emotions on 
accounting professionals’ decision-making processes. Recent accounting studies highlight the 
importance of EI on accountants’ job performance related to decision making, teamwork and 
client relations (Cook et al., 2011; Daff et al., 2012). Moreover, EI is considered to be a critical 
skill that allows practitioners to improve their ethical behavior when they deal with ethical 
dilemmas in public accounting (Angelidis and Ibrahim, 2011). The current study focuses on 
auditors in China. China has received much criticism in recent years for suspicious accounting 
practices, and there is much concern regarding audit quality in China because of dysfunctional 
audit behaviors in China (Chow et al,, 2006; Firth et al,, 2012). Thus, it is critical to understand 
factors influencing such behaviors and potential moderators that can mitigate dysfunctional 
auditor behavior to improve audit quality.  
 This study uses an experiment to investigate the moderation effect of EI on Chinese 
auditors’ judgments under different types of pressures. Specifically, auditors are presented with a 
hypothetical scenario involving a questionable accounts receivable transaction. They are asked to 
indicate the material misstatement risk associated with this transaction and the likelihood that 
they will investigate further. The presence and absence of an internal pressure (time budget) and 
an external pressure (client incentive) were manipulated between participants. The instrument 
included the 16-item version of the WEIP scale, which is commonly used in management and 
organizational behavior research to measure EI (e.g., Jordan and Lawrence, 2009; Cherniss, 
2010). This study’s experimental setting, therefore, extends the extant literature by 
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simultaneously incorporating different types of pressures and examining the effect of EI on 
auditor judgments.  
The study’s participants indicated that the pressures investigated in this study are of 
practical importance. Specifically, they indicated that meeting time budgets is very important and 
they experience high levels of job stress in their organizations. The results suggest that EI is key 
to understanding the impact of pressures on auditor judgments. Different behavior patterns are 
found between participants with high EI and low EI. As expected, participants with low EI are 
more likely to request extra time to gather additional audit evidence and investigate the 
questionable account receivable transaction further when they experience high client incentive 
pressure and low time budget pressure.  
 The results indicate that auditors with high EI make more conservative judgments than 
those with low EI when they are exposed to pressures. Specifically, high EI auditors assess 
higher material misstatement risk and are more likely to investigate the questionable transaction 
further when they are exposed to both internal and external pressures at work. In other words, EI 
can effectively reduce auditors’ tendencies to engage in dysfunctional behaviors promoted by job 
pressures. Additionally, the results suggest that professional skepticism is positively associated 
with EI.  
 The supplemental analyses provide additional evidence of EI’s moderating effects and 
positive correlation with conservative auditor judgments. These results indicate that high EI 
auditors are more conservative in their overall judgment and decision making and are more 
aware of clients’ incentives for misstatement. Furthermore, alternative dependent measures also 
indicate that EI level is positively correlated with conservative auditor judgments.  
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Contributions 
The current study contributes to the literature on audit judgment and pressures in the 
audit environment in several important ways. First, this study is the first of which I am aware 
that examines the effect of EI on auditor judgment. Prior research demonstrates that EI training 
can help health professionals to manage their own and other people’s feelings, which allow them 
to effectively decrease their occupational stress, increase commitment, and enhance job 
performance (Nikolaou and Tsaousis, 2002; Jordan, Ashkanasy, Hartel, and Hooper, 2002). 
Auditing has long been considered a stressful occupation (Fisher, 2001), and it is considered to 
be a profession at risk.10 Auditing, as a profession, has unique features that can exacerbate work 
pressure. For example, demands to complete tasks within specified time periods during the busy 
season can have adverse consequences on the judgment of auditing professionals. Further, 
auditors must interact with client management throughout the audit process, and this interaction 
can cause job stress (Fisher, 2001; Nelson and Tan, 2005). This stress is the result of the 
requirement for the auditor to remain independent and skeptical, while simultaneously 
developing and maintaining a good relationship with the client (Nelson, 2009). Auditors are also 
exposed to different legal challenges, such as litigation risk (DeZoort and Lord, 1997). Thus, it is 
worthwhile to test whether EI can play a specific role to influence professionals’ behavior within 
the unique context of the auditing profession. This study builds upon research on the impact of 
EI on job performance in other disciplines by evaluating how EI influences auditor judgment 
under two forms of pressure encountered in practice: time budget pressure and client incentive 
pressure. By using a 2x2 experiment, I found that participants with low EI are more conservative 
and skeptical when they experience high client incentive pressure and low time budget pressure. 
                                                          
10 Auditing:  a profession at risk. U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/0601auditing.pdf 
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However, high EI participants assess higher misstatement risk and are more likely to investigate 
the questionable transaction further when they are exposed to both internal and external 
pressures at work. 
Moreover, understanding the role of EI in mitigating auditors’ pressure and influencing 
judgment and decision making is important to public accounting firms’ practices with regard to 
recruiting, training, and promotion decisions. EI is an important skill that may lead to social and 
emotional satisfaction (Sy, Tram, and Hara, 2006; Guleryuz, Guney, Aydın, and Asan, 2008). EI 
training could help auditors to recognize and deal with the different affective reactions they may 
experience when dealing with clients (Bhattacharjee et al., 2011).  Thus, this study supports a 
public accounting firms’ decision to invest in developing training programs in order to improve 
the EI of their accountant (e.g. Deloitte, 2010), as EI is positively related to auditor conservative 
judgment.  
Implications 
The results of this study have implications for researchers, practitioners, and regulators. 
From the research standpoint, this study provides evidence of the joint and unique effects of 
organizational and environmental pressures on auditor judgments, building upon prior research 
on the individual effects of different pressures. It also underscores the importance of the 
understanding of EI’s effect on judgment and decision making in the accounting profession. 
From a practical standpoint, finding that auditors with high EI make rational judgments may be 
of particular interest to the auditing profession.  
According to a new release of The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission, it is very challenging to avoid judgment biases in order to make high 
quality professional judgments (COSO, 2012). Awareness and understanding of common JDM 
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errors and biases is an important step toward avoiding them, which is also a critical component 
in auditing. As pressures lead to dysfunctional auditor behaviors and impair audit quality, 
specific strategies, such as EI training could be indicated as a means to raise auditors’ awareness 
of judgment biases and mitigate the quality-threatening effects of these pressures.  
 This study also has implications for international accounting research. China completed 
the international convergence of auditing standards in 2010.11 The importance of improving audit 
quality and awareness of professional skepticism are highlighted in current Chinese auditing 
standards (CASB12; Chinese CPA Standards on Auditing, 2006). The regression results of the 
moderation effect of EI on auditor judgment could assist in helping standard setters to promote 
the awareness of EI training.  
Limitations of the Study 
 This study is subject to some limitations. Like most experimental studies, generalizability 
is a limitation in this study. The experiment utilized a hypothetical case with limited information 
about the client. In practice, auditors would have access to other information before making their 
judgment. For instance, auditors may review previous financial reports or have discussions with 
their colleagues before determining managers’ incentive to manipulate earnings. Moreover, the 
self-report questionnaire was used to obtain respondents’ EI scores. Thus, common method 
variance is a concern, as it may result in biased estimated relationships (Spector, 1987). The use 
of a self-report questionnaire may also constrain the results due to social desirability. Specifically, 
                                                          
11 Chinese Auditing Standards Board and International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board Issue Joint 
Statement Regarding Convergence of International Standards  (2010)  http://www.ifac.org/ 
12 the Chinese Auditing Standards Board (CASB) issues auditing Standards in China 
http://www.audit.gov.cn/n1992130/n1992165/n1993676/2601539.html 
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the respondents may have tried to provide answers they thought the experimenter wanted, which 
may have caused over-reporting of good behavior. 
 In addition, participants are auditing professionals in China. Due to unique cultural 
influences in China, the results of this study may not be generalizable in other countries. It is 
possible that culture factor may have more influence on auditor judgment in China than other 
counterparts. However, prior studies of accounting professionals in other cultures conclude that 
both time budget pressure and client incentive pressure increase auditors’ propensity to make 
unethical decisions (Robertson, 2010). Thus, it is reasonable to expect the hypothesized relations 
to hold with other countries. 
 Finally, another limitation concerns the use of the median points split to create the two 
subgroups (high vs. low EI groups). The creation of a categorical variable from a continuous 
measure results lower statistical power, which also “decreases the sensitivity of the measurement 
instrument” (e.g. Aguinis, 1995; Angelidis and Ibrahim, 2011, p.117). In this study, two 
independent variables are manipulated at low and high levels. For consistency, I also create low 
and high EI groups using a median split of the EI responses.   
Future Research 
 There are several avenues for future research. First, this study demonstrates that EI has a 
moderation effect on auditor judgment under two types of pressure, and future research could 
examine the effects of EI on judgment and decision making in other characteristics. For example, 
future research could extend this study into social influence settings. The potential moderation 
effect of EI under social pressures and incentives would be of interest for future studies. 
 Second, while the current study only focuses on staff and senior auditors, future research 
could investigate whether EI influences decision-making of other levels of auditors, such as 
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managers and partners. More experienced auditors may react to job pressures differently and EI 
may play a different role in their judgments. Moreover, future research may wish to explore 
whether culture differences, as well as other factors, such as individual personality, will affect 
the role of EI in accounting setting. 
 Third, a different pattern of behavior is observed in the high EI group than in the low EI 
group. Specially, the interaction between the two different pressures is non-significant. Future 
research should investigate other factors that may influence this interaction.  
 This study provides evidence of a moderation effect of EI on auditor judgments, which 
answers calls from prior research suggesting that additional studies examine the impact of 
emotions on auditor judgments (Cianci and Bierstaker, 2009; Bhattacharjee et al., 2011). The 
results suggest that the moderating influence of EI on auditor judgments can effectively reduce 
auditors’ tendencies to engage in dysfunctional behavior in order to improve audit quality. 
Specially, I found that auditors with high EI make more conservative judgments than auditors 
with low EI when facing time pressure and client pressure.  Hence, EI training programs are 
recommended to improve the judgments of auditors.    
Furthermore, there is a positive relation between EI and professional skepticism 
suggesting that auditors with high EI are more skeptical and assess higher risk than auditors with 
low EI. In conclusion, moderation analysis suggests that EI is a significant mechanism which 
drives the joint effects of different types of pressures on auditor judgments.  
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Appendix A 
 
THE AUDIT OF GTL TECHNOLOGIES 
 
 
Section 1: The Audit of GTL Ltd 
Assume that Taylor, as an audit staff, is working on the audit engagement for a public client, 
GTL Technologies, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2011. GTL sells electronic 
accessories for cell phones, computers, and other technologies. GTL purchases its inventory 
from manufacturers and sells to businesses and individuals. 
 
Over the past few years, GTL’s financial performance and share prices have been improving 
steadily, and it has been profitable. Taylor’s firm has audited GTL during this time, and has 
always given standard, unqualified opinions for both its financial statements and internal 
controls.  
 
The following table presents selected account balances from GTL’s financial statements: 
 
12/31/2011 (Before Audit Adjustments) 
Sales   $384,992,000 Merchandise Inventory     $60,115,000 
Net Income     $29,200,000 Total Assets   $242,130,000  
    
Average Number of Common Shares Outstanding  20,000,000 
 
 
    
Earnings Per Share (EPS) $1.46   
 
High (Low) Incentive 
Consensus analysts’ EPS forecast for 12/31/11: $1.44 ($1.39).  
Many of GTL’s executives,  including the controller receive a bonus if the company equals 
or exceeds the consensus analysts’ EPS forecast. 
 
High (Low) Time Budget Pressure   
The audit fee for GTL has increased slightly every year during the three years Taylor’ s firm has 
audited them. This is due to inflation and increasing market rates for audit services. However, 
this year GTL contacted the partner in charge of the audit to re-negotiate the fees on the basis 
that Taylor’ s firm should now be more efficient in performing the audit, due to the long 
involvement the firm has had in auditing GTL. After negotiating with GTL, the audit partner in 
charge decided to reduce the audit fees and the hours allocated to the audit. Thus, the total 
audit budgeted hours will be cut by about 20%. (After negotiating with GTL, the audit partner 
in charge decided to charge the same audit fee as last year (e.g., the audit fee will not increase 
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this year), and he has allocated the same amount of hours to the audit that were allocated last 
year. In previous years, the time budget has been reasonable for the amount of work involved, 
and the same amount of work is expected this year.)  
 
Accounts Receivable audit  
This is Taylor’s first time working on the audit of GTL Ltd. He has been asked to perform 
substantive testing for the accounts receivable audit.  
Please assume that no audit adjustments have been proposed at this point, and there is 
only one audit issue to be resolved before completing the audit. This issue is described 
below. Prior to field work, your firm set materiality for accounts receivable at 
$1,000,000 (i.e., 5 cents effect on EPS). 
 
When testing a transaction, Taylor finds one sale does not have a sales report. The accounts 
receivable in question involves one of GTL’s electronic product sales. Specifically, GTL shows 
60,000 units of the electronic accessory sold at year end. GTL’s recorded sales price is $20 per 
unit, or a total of $1,200,000 (i.e., 6 cents of EPS). However, there is no sales report 
documenting this sale. 
When Taylor approaches GTL’s management about this problem, he is told the documents have 
been misplaced but management can vouch for the fact that the documents have been correctly 
recorded. To verify the validity of this undocumented sale, Taylor would have to contact an 
overseas customer. Contacting this customer would take a considerable amount of time.  
 
High (Low) Client Incentive 
If the entire sale in question is written off, GTL will miss (exceed) the EPS forecast, and the 
executives will not (will) receive a bonus.  Also, the controller told Taylor: “if the executives 
do not (do) receive their bonus they will be displeased with (pleased with) the outcome of 
the audit.” 
  
High (Low) Time Budget Pressure  
Taylor is meeting the manager in charge of the audit at 5 PM to finalize (discuss) this accounts 
receivable section of the audit. Assume it is nearing 5 PM, and Taylor has reached the end of his 
time budget for this section of the audit. For this transaction to be verified, Taylor would (may) 
have to ask the manager for more time. Taylor knows that the manager has denied (granted) 
extensions of time in other areas of the audit due to the tightness of the time budget (as the 
budget is relatively flexible). 
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1. In this situation, how likely is it that Taylor will further investigate this account receivable 
transaction?  
 
Extremely  
     
Extremely  
Unlikely  
     
Likely  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
2. In this situation, how likely is it that Taylor will ask the manager in charge of the audit for 
extra time before making a final recommendation?  
 
Extremely  
     
Extremely  
Unlikely  
     
Likely  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
3. In this situation, how likely is it that Taylor will accept the client’s explanation of the missing 
sales report and not investigate the matter further? 
 
Extremely  
     
Extremely  
Unlikely  
     
Likely  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4. In this situation, what level of material misstatement risk do you think Taylor will associate 
with this accounts receivable testing?  
 
Extremely  
     
Extremely  
Low  
     
High  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5. Please indicate the extent of overall stress that Taylor experienced in this case. 
 
Extremely  
     
Extremely  
Low 
     
High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       
6. How much pressure do you think Taylor feels to keep the client happy? 
 
Extremely  
     
Extremely  
Low 
     
High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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7. The risk that Taylor’ s firm will suffer a loss (e.g., litigation risk) as a consequence of the 
GTL audit is  
 
Extremely  
     
Extremely  
Low 
     
High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
8.  If the entire sale in question is written off, will GTL miss or exceed the EPS forecast 
(select one)? 
     a. GTL will exceed the EPS forecast if the entire sale is written off. 
     b. GTL will miss the EPS forecast if the entire sale is written off.     
 
 
9. Did the audit partner decide to cut the total audit budget hours by about 20% (select one)? 
      a. Yes 
      b. No 
 
 
10. GTL’s incentive to misstate this sale is   
 
Extremely  
     
Extremely  
Low 
     
High 
1 2 3 4 5   6 7 
 
11. With respect to the scenarios given in this survey, how tight did Taylor consider the time 
budgets to be overall? 
 
Extremely  
     
Extremely  
Low 
     
High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
Section 2  
Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. (Participants respond using a 
7-point Likert response format ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) for each 
item). 
 
Emotional Intelligence Scale 
Awareness of Own Emotions (Own Aware)  
1. I can explain the emotions I feel to team members.  
2. I can discuss the emotions I feel with other team members.  
3. If I feel down, I can tell team members what will make me feel better.  
4. I can talk to other members of the team about the emotions I experience.  
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Management of Own Emotions (Own Manage)  
5. I respect the opinion of team members, even if I think they are wrong. 
6. When I am frustrated with fellow team members, I can overcome my frustration.  
7. When deciding on a dispute, I try to see all sides of a disagreement before I come to a 
conclusion.  
8. I give a fair hearing to fellow team members’ ideas.  
 
Awareness of Others’ Emotions (Other Aware)  
9. I can read fellow team members ‘true’ feelings, even if they try to hide them.  
10. I am able to describe accurately the way others in the team are feeling 
11. When I talk to a team member I can gauge their true feelings from their body language. 
12. I can tell when team members don’t mean what they say. 
 
Management of Others’ Emotions (Other Manage)  
13. My enthusiasm can be contagious for members of a team.  
14. I am able to cheer team members up when they are feeling down.  
15. I can get fellow team members to share my keenness for a project.  
16. I can provide the ‘spark’ to get fellow team members enthusiastic. 
 
Professional skepticism scale 
1. I often question things that clients tell me. 
2. I require proof that my clients' statements are true. 
3. I am cautious when evaluating information obtained from clients. 
4. Clients are generally honest (reverse item). 
5. I tend to trust what clients tell me (reverse item). 
 
 
Section 3 
Please answer a few final questions about yourself. 
 
1. Please indicate the best description of your current work position:    
  Auditor Staff          Auditor Senior        Auditor Manager      
  Other (please explain) ______________ 
2. How many years of full time work experience do you have in each of the following 
categories:  
In Auditing ___________________   In Accounting _________________    
Other (please explain) ______________________ 
3. How would you describe your current employer?  
a. Single office firm   b. Regional firm    c. National firm  
d. Big 4 firm    e. Other (please specify) ______________________________ 
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4. How long have you been employed with your current employer? ______________ 
 
5. Please indicate any professional designations you possess (Choose all that apply):   
  CICPA 
  Certified Junior Management Accountant 
  Certified Senior Management Accountant 
   Other (Please explain) _____________________________ 
 
6. In your experience, how attainable are the time budgets at your organization? 
            Easily                                             Attainable with                                          Impossible to  
          Attainable                                             effort                                                       achieve                        
  1                  2                  3                    4                   5                   6                   7                   
 
7. What level of importance is placed on meeting time budgets in your organization? 
Extremely  
     
Extremely  
Low 
     
High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
8. Please indicate the extent of overall stress you experienced in your organization. 
Extremely  
     
Extremely  
Low 
     
High 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
9. In what year were you born?  _____________ 
 
10. What is your gender?     
  Male           Female 
  
11.  Please select the highest education level you have attained: 
  High School 
  Associate Degree 
  Undergraduate Degree 
  Master Degree or higher  
 
Thank you for your participation in this survey! 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Demographic Information 
  
Auditors (n = 190) 
 Female 100 52.6% 
Mean Age (Range) 26.06 (24 to 29) 
 
Highest Degree Completed: 
 
 
 
Undergraduate Degree 150 78.9% 
 
Master Degree 40 21.1% 
Certifications: 
 
 
 
CICPA (Chinese CPA) 146 76.8% 
 
Certified Senior Management 
Accountant 
3 
1.6% 
 
Certified Junior Management 
Accountant 
5 
2.60% 
Auditing Experience in Years 
 
 
 
Mean (Std. Deviation) 2.26(1.04) 
2.4 
(1.0) 
Accounting Experience in Years 
 
 
 
Mean (Std. Deviation) 0.13(0.373) 
1.4 
(0.5) 
Job Title: 
  
 
Auditor Staff 160 15.8% 
 
Auditor Team Leader (Senior) 30 84.2% 
Employer: 
  
 
Big-4  160 84.2% 
  Non Big-4  30 15.8% 
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\Table 2  
    Panel A: Means (and standard deviations) for further 
investigation 
Time Budget 
Pressure 
Client Incentive Pressure   
Descriptives Low High Total 
Low Mean 2.80 4.13 3.51 
 
(n) 40 46 86 
 
(SD) .758 1.222 1.225 
High Mean 3.76 4.83 4.44 
 
(n) 38 6613 104 
 
(SD) .998 1.660 1.538 
Total Mean 3.27 4.54 4.02 
 
(n) 78 112 190 
 
(SD) 1.002 1.530 1.476 
     Table 2 
    Panel B: Means (and standard deviations) for risk assessment 
Time Budget 
Pressure 
Client Incentive Pressure   
Descriptives Low High Total 
Low Mean 3.05 4.26 3.70 
 
(n) 40 46 86 
 
(SD) .677 0.953 1.030 
High Mean 3.79 5.29 4.74 
 
(n) 38 66 104 
 
(SD) .811 1.345 1.379 
Total Mean 3.41 4.87 4.27 
 
(n) 78 112 190 
 
(SD) 0.829 1.298 1.336 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
     
                                                          
13 Box’s test from MANCOVA shows equal covariance metrics (F = 0.884, p = 0.613), so unequal sample size does 
not cause the problem.   
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Results of MANCOVA using auditors' judgment of the level of risk and  
the likelihood of further investigation as dependent variables. 
Source of variation Dependent variable SS df F p 
Audit Further investigation 4.495 1.000 3.964 0.048 
 
Risk level 0.098 1.000 0.086 0.770 
PS Further investigation 156.287 1.000 137.815 0.000 
 
Risk level 72.764 1.000 63.446 0.000 
TB Further investigation 10.733 1.000 9.465 0.002 
 
Risk level 24.677 1.000 21.517 0.000 
Error Further investigation 210.931 186.000 
  
 
Risk level 213.318 186.000 
  Error           
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Table 4 
     Results of MANCOVA using auditors' judgment of the level of risk and  
the likelihood of further investigation as dependent variables. 
Source of variation Dependent variable SS df F p 
Audit Further investigation 4.59193 1 4.694 0.032 
 
Risk level 0.124084 1 0.135 0.713 
PS Further investigation 151.0075 1 154.351 0.000 
 
Risk level 69.31849 1 75.635 0.000 
CI Further investigation 39.69267 1 40.571 0.000 
 
Risk level 67.52876 1 73.682 0.000 
Error Further investigation 181.9713 186 
    Risk level 170.4662 186     
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Table 5 
     
Results of MANCOVA using auditors' judgment of the level of risk and  
the likelihood of further investigation as dependent variables. 
Source of variation Dependent variable SS df F p 
Audit Further investigation 4.562086 1 4.903 0.028 
 
Risk level 0.079284 1 0.097 0.756 
PS Further investigation 130.4747 1 140.225 0.000 
 
Risk level 50.4013 1 61.753 0.000 
TB Further investigation 9.546189 1 10.260 0.002 
 
Risk level 18.79357 1 23.026 0.000 
CI Further investigation 38.18552 1 41.039 0.000 
 
Risk level 62.20955 1 76.220 0.000 
TB * CI Further investigation 2.39961 1 2.579 0.110 
 
Risk level 0.322761 1 0.395 0.530 
Error Further investigation 171.2059 184 
    Risk level 150.1772 184     
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Table 6 
     Results of MANCOVA using auditors' judgment of the level of risk and  
the likelihood of further investigation as dependent variables. 
Sources of variation Dependent Variable SS Df F p 
Audit Further investigation 2.661 1 3.191 0.076 
 
Risk level 0.000 1 0.000 0.999 
PS Further investigation 4.376 1 5.247 0.023 
 
Risk level 2.415 1 2.371 0.125 
TB Further investigation 17.973 1 21.552 0.000 
 
Risk level 31.226 1 30.648 0.000 
EI Further investigation 50.433 1 60.476 0.000 
 
Risk level 21.661 1 21.261 0.000 
TB *EI Further investigation 7.972 1 9.559 0.002 
 
Risk level 4.652 1 4.566 0.034 
Error Further investigation 153.445 184 
    Risk level 187.466 184     
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Table 7 
     Results of MANCOVA using auditors' judgment of the level of risk and  
the likelihood of further investigation as dependent variables. 
Sources of variation Dependent Variable SS Df F p 
Audit Further investigation 1.906006 1 3.083 0.081 
 
Risk level 0.068638 1 0.101 0.751 
PS Further investigation 3.910914 1 6.326 0.013 
 
Risk level 1.843086 1 2.714 0.101 
CI Further investigation 47.41132 1 76.694 0.000 
 
Risk level 75.70019 1 111.484 0.000 
EI Further investigation 45.38385 1 73.415 0.000 
 
Risk level 17.55224 1 25.849 0.000 
CI *EI Further investigation 20.37942 1 32.966 0.000 
 
Risk level 26.24093 1 38.645 0.000 
Error Further investigation 113.7462 184 
    Risk level 124.9397 184     
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Table 8 
     
Results of MANCOVA using auditors' judgment of the level of risk and  
the likelihood of further investigation as dependent variables. 
Sources of variation Dependent Variable SS Df F p 
Audit 
Further investigation 1.784 1 3.634 0.058 
Risk level 0.180 1 0.373 0.542 
PS 
Further investigation 0.851 1 1.733 0.190 
Risk level 0.002 1 0.004 0.951 
TB 
Further investigation 15.778 1 32.134 0.000 
Risk level 22.375 1 46.391 0.000 
CI Further investigation 43.610 1 88.821 
0.000 
Risk level 65.213 1 135.211 0.000 
EI 
Further investigation 49.379 1 100.570 0.000 
Risk level 21.234 1 44.027 0.000 
TB * CI 
Further investigation 3.195 1 6.507 0.012 
Risk level 0.124 1 0.256 0.613 
TB * EI Further investigation 5.493 1 11.187 
0.001 
Risk level 1.362 1 2.824 0.095 
CI * EI Further investigation 18.987 1 38.671 
0.000 
Risk level 22.630 1 46.920 0.000 
TB * CI * EI Further investigation 1.646 1 3.353 
0.069 
Risk level 9.450 1 19.593 0.000 
Error 
Further investigation 88.378 180 
 
 
Risk level 86.815 180 
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Table 9 
     Results of ANCOVA using auditors' judgment of  the level of risk  
as dependent variables when EI=0 
Sources of 
variation 
SS Df F p 
 Audit 0.058 1 0.125 0.725 
 PS 2.763 1 5.953 0.017 
 TB 5.430 1 11.698 0.001 
 CI 5.342 1 11.509 0.001 
 TB * CI 4.546 1 9.795 0.002 
 Error 41.310 89     
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Table 10 
     Results of ANCOVA using auditors' judgment of  the level of risk  
as dependent variables when EI=1 
Sources of 
variation 
SS Df F p 
 Audit 0.510 1 1.090 0.299 
 PS 1.015 1 2.170 0.144 
 TB 18.296 1 39.132 0.000 
 CI 80.208 1 171.553 0.000 
 TB * CI 5.734 1 12.264 0.001 
 Error 41.611 89     
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Table 11 
     Results of ANCOVA using auditors' judgment of the likelihood of  
further investigation as dependent variables when EI=0 
Sources of 
variation 
SS Df F p 
 
Audit 0.865 1 1.668 0.200 
 PS 0.158 1 0.304 0.583 
 TB 1.540 1 2.969 0.088 
 CI 2.757 1 5.315 0.023 
 TB * CI 4.899 1 9.443 0.003 
 Error 46.171 89     
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Table 12 
     Results of ANCOVA using auditors' judgment of the likelihood of  
further investigation as dependent variables when EI = 1 
Sources of 
variation 
SS Df F p 
 Audit 0.916 1 1.932 0.168 
 PS 0.670 1 1.414 0.238 
 TB 18.275 1 38.542 0.000 
 CI 55.772 1 117.625 0.000 
 TB * CI 0.121 1 0.256 0.614 
 Error 42.199 89     
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Table13   
  Hypotheses Summary   
Hypotheses p-value Supported 
H1: Auditors will make more conservative 
judgments when they experience less time 
pressure. <0.001 on both dependent variables √ 
H2b: Auditors will make less conservative 
judgments when the client has low incentive 
to influence the auditor. <0.001 on both dependent variables √ 
H3: Auditor judgment will be influenced by 
time budget pressure to a greater extent when 
client incentive pressure is absent than when 
client incentive pressure is present. 
<0.012 on Further investigation;  
0.613 on Risk level Partial 
H4: Auditors with high EI will make more 
conservative judgments than auditors with 
low EI when they are exposed to time budget 
pressure. 
<0.001 on Further investigation;  
0.095 on Risk level √ 
H5: Auditors with high EI will make more 
conservative judgments than auditors with 
low EI when they are exposed to client 
incentive pressure. <0.001 on both dependent variables √ 
H6: Auditors with high EI will make more 
conservative judgments than auditors with 
low EI when they are exposed to both time 
budget and client incentive pressure. 
<0.069on Further investigation;  
<0.001 on Risk level √ 
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Table 14 
    Panel A: Means (and standard deviations) for loss risk 
Time Budget 
Pressure  
CI   
Descriptives Low High Total 
Low Mean 2.88 4.02 3.49 
 
(SD) 0.757 0.802 0.967 
 
n 40 46 86 
High Mean 3.421 5.17 4.53 
 
(SD) 0.758 0.756 1.132 
 
n 38 66 104 
Total Mean 3.14 4.70 4.06 
 
(SD) 0.80 0.96 1.18 
  n 78 112 190 
Panel B: Results of ANCOVA using auditors' judgment of loss risk 
Source of variation SS df F p 
 Audit 1.19286 1 2.320 0.129 
 PS 14.0645 1 27.348 0.000 
 TB 22.8348 1 44.402 0.000 
 CI 81.4521 1 158.384 0.000 
 TB * CI 3.18192 1 6.187 0.014 
 Error 94.6259 184     
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Table 15 
     Results of MANCOVA using auditors' judgment of requesting extra time and  
accepting client explanation as dependent variables. 
Sources of variation Dependent Variable SS Df F p 
Audit Requesting time 1.304 1 2.734 0.100 
 
Accepting explanation 2.464 1 3.964 0.048 
avgPS Requesting time 2.775 1 5.816 0.017 
 
Accepting explanation 12.351 1 19.867 0.000 
TB Requesting time 8.449 1 17.708 0.000 
 
Accepting explanation 9.374 1 15.078 0.000 
CI Requesting time 40.761 1 85.427 0.000 
 
Accepting explanation 47.386 1 76.221 0.000 
EI Requesting time 54.195 1 113.584 0.000 
 
Accepting explanation 21.647 1 34.819 0.000 
TB * CI Requesting time 9.046 1 18.960 0.000 
 
Accepting explanation 0.158 1 0.254 0.615 
TB * EI Requesting time 0.857 1 1.797 0.182 
 
Accepting explanation 0.175 1 0.281 0.597 
CI * EI Requesting time 9.631 1 20.186 0.000 
 
Accepting explanation 1.615 1 2.598 0.109 
TB * CI * EI Requesting time 4.335 1 9.084 0.003 
 
Accepting explanation 0.917 1 1.474 0.226 
Error Requesting time 85.885 180 
  
 
Accepting explanation 111.906 180     
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Table 16 
     Results of ANCOVA using auditors' judgment of  the likelihood of 
requesting extra time as dependent variables when EI=0 
Sources of 
variation 
SS Df F p 
 Audit 0.053 1 0.150 0.700 
 PS 0.023 1 0.066 0.798 
 TB 2.583 1 7.254 0.008 
 CI 5.881 1 16.513 0.000 
 TB * CI 13.072 1 36.706 0.000 
 Error 31.696 89     
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Table 17 
     Results of ANCOVA using auditors' judgment of  requesting extra time 
as dependent variables when EI=1 
Sources of 
variation 
SS Df F p 
 
Audit 2.217 1 3.745 0.056 
 PS 3.906 1 6.599 0.012 
 TB 6.126 1 10.349 0.002 
 CI 40.204 1 67.921 0.000 
 TB * CI 0.456 1 0.770 0.383 
 Error 52.681 89     
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Table 18 
Results of ANCOVA using auditors' judgment of the likelihood of  
accepting client's explanation as dependent variables when EI = 0 
Sources of 
variation 
SS Df F p 
 Audit 1.310 1 2.150 0.146 
 PS 3.251 1 5.336 0.023 
 TB 3.760 1 6.173 0.015 
 CI 35.388 1 58.094 0.000 
 TB * CI 0.961 1 1.577 0.212 
 Error 54.215 89     
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Table 19 
     Results of ANCOVA using auditors' judgment of  the likelihood of 
accepting client's explanation  as dependent variables when EI=1 
Sources of 
variation 
SS Df F p 
 
Audit 1.113 1 1.717 0.193 
 PS 8.693 1 13.415 0.000 
 TB 5.660 1 8.735 0.004 
 CI 14.803 1 22.844 0.000 
 TB * CI 0.152 1 0.235 0.629 
 Error 57.671 89     
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Figure 1. Research Model 
Theoretical model adapted from DeZoort and Lord (1997) 
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    Figure 2. A model of Emotional Intelligence from Jordan and Lawrence (2009) 
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a Auditors indicated the likelihood that additional time and effort that would be spent to further 
investigate this questionable transaction. Participants responded using a seven point scale anchored by 
"extremely unlikely" (1) and "extremely likely" (7). This figure graphs the estimated marginal means of 
the likelihood of additional investigation with covariates appearing in the model evaluated at the 
following values:Auditing experience and Professional skepticism . See Table 3 for the MANCOVA 
results.
b Time budget pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
c Client incentive pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
Figure 3. Interaction of client incentive pressure and time budget pressure on auditors' 
assessment of the likelihood of additional investigation 
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a Auditors indicated the level of material misstatement risk they think will be associated with this 
account receivable transaction.  Participants responded using a seven point scale anchored by 
"extremely unlikely" (1) and "extremely likely" (7). This figure graphs This figure graphs the 
estimated marginal means of the auditors' risk assessment with covariates appearing in the model 
evaluated at the following values:Auditing experience and Professional skepticism . See Table 3 
for the MANCOVA results.
b Time budget pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
c Client incentive pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
Figure 4. Interaction of client incentive pressure and time budget pressure on auditors’ 
assessment of risk level 
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a Auditors indicated the likelihood that additional time and effort that would be spent to further investigate 
this questionable transaction. Participants responded using a seven point scale anchored by "extremely 
unlikely" (1) and "extremely likely" (7). This figure graphs the estimated marginal means of the 
likelihood of additional investigation with covariates appearing in the model evaluated at the following 
values:Auditing experience and Professional skepticism. See Table 6 for the MANCOVA results.
b Time budget pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
c EI was measured between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
Figure 5. Interaction of time budget pressure and EI on auditors' assessment of the 
likelihood of additional investigation 
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a Auditors indicated the level of material misstatement risk they think will be associated with this 
account receivable transaction.  Participants responded using a seven point scale anchored by 
"extremely unlikely" (1) and "extremely likely" (7). This figure graphs This figure graphs the 
estimated marginal means of the auditors' risk assessment with covariates appearing in the model 
evaluated at the following values:Auditing experience and Professional skepticism. See Table 6 
for the MANCOVA results.
b Time budget pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
c EI was measured between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
Figure 6. Interaction of time budget pressure and EI on auditors' assessment of risk level
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a Auditors indicated the likelihood that additional time and effort that would be spent to further 
investigate this questionable transaction. Participants responded using a seven point scale anchored by 
"extremely unlikely" (1) and "extremely likely" (7). This figure graphs the estimated marginal means 
of the likelihood of additional investigation with covariates appearing in the model evaluated at the 
following values:Auditing experience and Professional skepticism. See Table 7 for the MANCOVA 
results.
b Client incentive pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and  high. 
c Client incentive pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and  high. 
Fig. 7. Interaction of client incentive pressure and EI on auditors' assessment of risk 
level
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a Auditors indicated the level of material misstatement risk they think will be associated with this 
account receivable transaction.  Participants responded using a seven point scale anchored by "extremely 
unlikely" (1) and "extremely likely" (7). This figure graphs This figure graphs the estimated marginal 
means of the auditors' risk assessment with covariates appearing in the model evaluated at the following 
values:Auditing experience and Professional skepticism. See Table 7 for the MANCOVA results.
b EI was measured between subjects at two levels: low and  high.
c Client incentive pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and  high. 
Figure 8. Interaction of client incetnive pressure and EI on auditors' assessment of 
risk level
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a Auditors indicated the level of material misstatement risk they think will be associated with 
this account receivable transaction.  Participants responded using a seven point scale 
anchored by "extremely unlikely" (1) and "extremely likely" (7). This figure graphs This 
figure graphs the estimated marginal means of the auditors' risk assessment with covariates 
appearing in the model evaluated at the following values:Auditing experience and 
Professional skepticism . See Table 8 for the MANCOVA results.
b Time budget pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
c Client incentive pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
Figure 9. Interaction of client incentive pressure and time budget pressure on 
auditors' assessment of risk level
Time Budget
Pressureb
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a Auditors indicated the level of material misstatement risk they think will be associated with this 
account receivable transaction.  Participants responded using a seven point scale anchored by 
"extremely unlikely" (1) and "extremely likely" (7). This figure graphs This figure graphs the estimated 
marginal means of the auditors' risk assessment with covariates appearing in the model evaluated at the 
following values:Auditing experience and Professional skepticism . See Table 8 for the MANCOVA 
results.
b Time budget pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
c Client incentive pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
Figure 10. Interaction of client incentive pressure and time budget pressure on 
auditors' assessment of risk level
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Figure 11. Interaction of client incentive pressure and time budget pressure on auditors' 
assessment of the likelihood of additional investigation 
a Auditors indicated the likelihood that additional time and effort that would be spent to further investigate 
this questionable transaction. Participants responded using a seven point scale anchored by "extremely 
unlikely" (1) and "extremely likely" (7). This figure graphs the estimated marginal means of the likelihood 
of additional investigation with covariates appearing in the model evaluated at the following 
values:Auditing experience and Professional skepticism . See Table 8  for the MANCOVA results.
b Time budget pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
c Client incentive pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
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a Auditors indicated the likelihood that additional time and effort that would be spent to further investigate 
this questionable transaction. Participants responded using a seven point scale anchored by "extremely 
unlikely" (1) and "extremely likely" (7). This figure graphs the estimated marginal means of the likelihood 
of additional investigation with covariates appearing in the model evaluated at the following values:Auditing 
experience and Professional skepticism . See Table 8  for the MANCOVA results.
b Time budget pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
c Client incentive pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
Figure 12. Interaction of client incentive pressure and time budget pressure on auditors' 
assessment of the likelihood of additional investigation 
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Figure 13. Interaction of client incentive pressure and time budget pressure on auditors' 
assessment of the likelihood of requesting extra time
a Auditors indicated the likelihood that that requesting the manager in charge of the audit for extra 
time before making a final recommendation. Participants responded using a seven point scale 
anchored by "extremely unlikely" (1) and "extremely likely" (7). This figure graphs the estimated 
marginal means of the likelihood of requesting extra time with covariates appearing in the model 
evaluated at the following values:Auditing experience and Professional skepticism . See Table 9  
for the MANCOVA results.
b Time budget pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
c Client incentive pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
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Figure 14. Interaction of client incentive pressure and time budget pressure on auditors' 
assessment of the likelihood of requesting extra time 
a Auditors indicated the likelihood of requesting the manager in charge of the audit for extra time before 
making a final recommendation. Participants responded using a seven point scale anchored by "extremely 
unlikely" (1) and "extremely likely" (7). This figure graphs the estimated marginal means of the 
likelihood of requesting extra time with covariates appearing in the model evaluated at the following 
values:Auditing experience and Professional skepticism . See Table 9  for the MANCOVA results.
b Time budget pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
c Client incentive pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
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a Auditors indicated the likelihood of accepting the client’s explanation of the missing sales 
report and not investigate the matter further. Participants responded using a seven point scale 
anchored by "extremely unlikely" (1) and "extremely likely" (7). This figure graphs the estimated 
marginal means of the likelihood of accepting the client’s explanation with covariates appearing 
in the model evaluated at the following values:Auditing experience and Professional skepticism . 
See Table 9  for the MANCOVA results.
b Time budget pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
c Client incentive pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
Figure 15. Interaction of client incentive pressure and time budget pressure on 
auditors' assessment of the likelihood of accepting the client’s explanation 
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a Auditors indicated the likelihood of accepting the client’s explanation of the missing sales report and not 
investigate the matter further. Participants responded using a seven point scale anchored by "extremely 
unlikely" (1) and "extremely likely" (7). This figure graphs the estimated marginal means of the likelihood 
of accepting the client’s explanation with covariates appearing in the model evaluated at the following 
values:Auditing experience and Professional skepticism . See Table 9  for the MANCOVA results.
b Time budget pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
c Client incentive pressure was manipulated between subjects at two levels: low and high. 
Figure 16. Interaction of client incentive pressure and time budget pressure on 
auditors' assessment of the likelihood of accepting the client’s explanation 
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